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THE REALITY OF FAMILY PRESERVATION UNDER
NORMAN v. JOHNSON
INTRODUCTION
In the past, foster care has often been the first option selected when a family
is in trouble. . . . Far too many children and families have been broken
apart when they could have been preserved with a little effort. Foster care
ought to be a last resort rather than the first.'
In 1980, Congress passed the Child Welfare and Adoption Assis-
tance Act2 (Adoption Assistance Act) to remedy the many problems
which plagued the foster care system. The foster care system exper-
ienced a dramatic increase in the number of foster children through-
out the 1970s and 1980s.a The excessive length of time which the
children spent in foster care also concerned Congress." Furthermore,
many experts argued that foster care was not in children's best in-
terests when they could live safely at home.' As a result, Congress
1. 126 CONG. REC. 6942 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston regarding the Child Welfare and
Adoption Assistance Act).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-603, 608-612, 620-625, 627-628, 655, 658, 670-676, 1305, 1308, 1318,
1320b2-3, 1382d, 1395y, 1395cc, 1397, 1397a-e (1988 & Supp. 1991).
3. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS. 102D CONG., IST SESS., OVERVIEW OF THE ENTITLE-
MENT PROGRAM 1991 GREEN BOOK 839 (Comm. Print 1991) (explaining the history of the foster
care system and how it evolved into the current system) [hereinafter HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS]; 125 CONG. REC. 22,681 (1979) (estimating that the number of children in foster care in
1977 was approximately three times the number of children in foster care in 1961).
4. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 787; see also 125 CONG. REC. 22,681
(1979) (stating that over half the children in foster care had been away from their families for
two years and that approximately 100,000 children had been in foster care for over six years); 23
CONG. REc. 24,861 (1977) (statement of Vice Pres. Mondale) ("Too often children who could be
placed with permanent families remain in foster care because the special help to make these chil-
dren adoptable simply is not available. . . . Often children are simply swallowed up in the system
.. [. m]any [of whom] could be forced to spend their entire childhood living in large
institutions.").
5. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 784; 126 CONG. REC. 14,645 (1980)
(statement of Sen. Maguire) (approving the idea that states adopt new protections against unnec-
essary and prolonged foster care, and recommending services aimed at preventing the removal of
the child from the home); see H.R. REP. No. 395, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990) (explaining the
value of preventing family separation according to a wide -range of child welfare experts); 123
CONG. REc. 24,866 (1977) (statement of Sen. Cranston) (stating that the human costs of failing
to take whatever steps possible to prevent the removal of a child from his family are beyond
calculation); see also Carol R. Golubuck, Cash Assistance to Families: An Essential Component
of Reasonable Efforts to Prevent and Eliminate Foster Care Placement of Their Children, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1393, 1400 (1986) (concluding that it makes no sense from a humanitarian
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passed the Adoption Assistance Act to remedy these problems by
focusing on the goal of keeping families together rather than sepa-
rating them.
This Note first discusses the foster care system generally and then
specifically in Illinois. The Note focuses on the problems which
plague the Illinois foster care system and the way that the system
impacts families. Also, since a large number of children entering the
Illinois foster care system come from poor families, it is necessary to
explore some of the special problems that these poor families face.
Consequently, this Note discusses the shortage of affordable housing
and resulting homelessness. It illustrates how these problems com-
plicate the situation of poor parents who risk losing or have already
lost their children to the foster care system. The Note then exam-
ines the possible protection the law offers to these families. Al-
though the Constitution has traditionally protected families, the
Note focuses on the Child Welfare and Adoption Assistance Act
because of its significant impact on the legal rights of foster children
and their families. The Act provides, among other things, that the
state must make reasonable efforts to keep families together before
placing a child in the foster care system. The Note discusses a re-
cent Supreme Court decision that did not find such a right and ex-
plains the ramifications of this case.
Finally, this Note presents the Norman v. Johnson7 decision,
which addresses the problems of poor families who, because of inad-
equate resources, lose their children to the foster care system. In
early 1990, a class of impoverished parents sued the Illinois child
welfare agency, the Department of Child and Family Services
(DCFS), arguing that DCFS violated the Act by taking away their
children without making reasonable efforts to keep their families to-
perspective to unnecessarily separate families when cash assistance can keep the families to-
gether); Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 214-15 (1988) (explaining
that foster care reform has fallen into two main camps: 1) that which focuses on preventive ser-
vices which would eliminate the need to separate children from their families, and 2) that which
focuses on permanency planning so that children can either be promptly returned home or alterna-
tively, permanently adopted); Reasonable Efforts to Prevent the Necessity for Foster Care Place-
ment: An Important Mandate of Pub. L. No. 96-272, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1394 (1985) (stat-
ing that one of the philosophies behind the 1980 legislative reforms is that if children can be
protected in their home through state assistance, they are better off than in the foster care
system).
6. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 787; 124 CONG. REc. 34,715-17
(1978); Mushlin, supra note 5, at 215.
7. 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. II1. 1990).
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gether.8 An Illinois federal district court found that before the state
can take children from their parents, the state must make reasona-
ble efforts to preserve the family where it would not endanger the
children. 9 An analysis of the opinion and consent decree shows how
the Adoption Assistance Act should provide poor parents and their
children with some relief, but it questions whether impoverished Illi-
nois foster children and their families really have much hope.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Foster Care System
1. Overview of the System
States funded by the federal government10 have the responsibility
of organizing and providing foster care to children who are
abused," neglected,12 chemically dependent, abandoned,'" or home-
8. Id. at 1184.
9. Id. at 1187.
10. These various funding provisions in titles IV-B, IV-E, and XX of the Social Security Act
collectively form the Adoption Assistance Act. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra
note 3, at 748.
11. Black's Law Dictionary defines child abuse as "any form of cruelty to a child's physical,
moral or mental well-being." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., In re
Carthen, 384 N.E.2d 723 (11. App. Ct. 1978) (finding abuse where the mother admitted wrapping
a television cord around the child's neck and where the child had old scars on his arms, legs, and
upper back which appeared to be caused by an electrical cord); In re Jones, 376 N.E.2d 49 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1978) (finding abuse where the child had burns on each foot, but where there was no
evidence of splash marks which the parent asserted caused the burns); In re Holmes, 328 N.E.2d
35 (II1. App. Ct. 1975) (finding abuse where a parent was convicted of aggravated battery upon
her child); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3(2) (1991) (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (1992))
(defining abused minors as those whose parents or any person either responsible for their welfare
or living in the same household 1) inflict or allow to be inflicted intentional physical injury which
"causes death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or impairment of
any bodily function"; 2) create a substantial risk of physical injury; 3) commit a sex offense; 4)
torture or allow torture; or 5) inflict excessive corporal punishment).
12. Black's Law Dictionary defines a neglected child as one whose parents or custodians, by
reason of cruelty, mental incapacity, immorality, or depravity are unfit to properly care for the
child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990). Alternatively, a child is neglected when his
or her parents fail to provide necessary physical, emotional, medical, surgical, or hospital care -
consequently endangering the health or morals of the child. Id.; see, e.g., In re Stilley, 363 N.E.2d
820 (11. 1977) (finding neglect where the parent allowed a four-year-old child to wander the
streets at 11:00 p.m., frequently left the child in the care of others and failed to return, had a drug
problem, suffered mental illness, and caused the child to exhibit psychological effects of unstable
parenting); Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (I1. 1952) (finding neglect where the parents
failed to provide their child with life saving medical treatment because of their religious beliefs),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re Hill, 430 N.E.2d 75 (I1. App. Ct. 1981) (finding neglect
where the family apartment did not contain food, a stove, a refrigerator, beds, running water, or
gas; the toilet was filled with excrement; and the children had neglected wounds and inadequate
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less. When a report of abuse or neglect is filed, a temporary custody
hearing is held to determine the following: whether there is probable
cause to believe that the child is abused, neglected, 4 or chemically
dependent; if so, whether it is an immediate and urgent necessity to
remove the child from the home; and finally, whether reasonable
efforts have been made to eliminate the necessity of removing the
child from the home (or whether good cause has been shown that
reasonable efforts would not or could not be effective).' 5 If these
elements are met, the child enters the state's custody and will be
placed in a relative's home, in a foster home, or in a temporary shel-
ter. 6 Next, an adjudicatory hearing or trial is held to determine
whether the child is abused, neglected, or dependent. 17 If the court
finds that abuse has occurred, the child becomes a ward of the
state.' 8 Finally, a dispositional hearing is held in which the state
petitions to terminate the parental rights of the abused child's
parents. 19
muscle tone); In re Nitz, 394 N.E.2d 887 (Il1. App. Ct. 1979) (finding neglect where the family
apartment was cold, dirty, littered with garbage and half-eaten food, and inhabited by rats and
where the child was hospitalized twice because he was not gaining weight and his growth was
retarded); see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-3(l) (1991) (705 ILCS 405/1-3 (1992))
(defining a neglected minor as one whose parents do "not provide the proper or necessary support,
education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as
necessary for a minor's well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being, including
adequate food, clothing and shelter, or who is abandoned by his or her parents . . . or any minor
whose environment is injurious to his or her welfare . . . or any newborn whose blood or urine
contains any amount of a controlled substance").
13. Black's Law Dictionary defines abandonment of children as desertion, willful forsaking, or
foregoing parental duties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., In re Adoption of
J. Markhan, 414 N.E.2d 1351 (11. App. Ct. 1981) (defining abandonment as conduct which dem-
onstrates a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and to relinquish all parental claims to
children); In re Cech, 291 N.E.2d 21 (I1. App. Ct. 1972) (finding that a father did not abandon
his child where he saw the child frequently after the separation, continuously inquired about him,
sent gifts, provided support, and maintained hospital insurance for him); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 198
N.E.2d 743 (Il. App. Ct. 1964) (finding that a mother did not abandon her child where she sent
her clothing and gifts, took out an insurance policy on her life, and visited her several times).
14. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 748; see supra notes 11-13 (defining
neglect, abuse, and abandonment). But see RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL
VICTIMS OF THE WAR AGAINST CHILD ABUSE 17 (1990). Neglect could be found in almost any
situation in which a caseworker wants to find it; for example, a case worker may allege neglect if a
parent gives a child money to eat at McDonalds too often, if a parent does not allow a child to
watch television after 7:30 p.m., or if a parent is late picking a child up from school. Id.
15. Lee Ann Lowder, Rights and Responsibilities of a Guardian ad Litem, in JUVENILE LAW
AND PRACTICE 12-1, 12-40 to 12-48 (1990).
16. Id. at 12-49.
17. Id. at 12-57.
18. Id.
19. See Bradner C. Riggs, Neglected Children - Disposition, in JUVENILE LAW AND PRAC-
[Vol. 42:675
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2. Crisis of the National Foster Care System
Although the state foster care systems are maintained to protect
the best interests of abused and neglected children, they tradition-
ally fail in many respects. In the 1970s, increased federal funding20
and the rapid growth of state child abuse programs21 led to an ex-
plosion in the number of children entering the foster care system.2
The average estimated monthly number of children in foster care
more than doubled from 97,000 in 1982 to 197,000 in 1991.3 With
the increase in children entering the foster care system, many agen-
cies lacked sufficient organization, supervision, personnel, or fund-
ing24 to adequately handle all of the cases.25
As a result of both the explosion in the number of children placed
in foster care and the economic incentives for the system to continue
to feed that trend, the system became less focused on maintaining
the children in their homes. Rather than trying to rehabilitate fami-
lies, the system emphasized foster care. Since the federal govern-
ment funded the foster care system while the state treasury provided
family rehabilitation services, the state saved itself money by plac-
ing children into foster care.26 Moreover, placing children in foster
care could be quite lucrative for foster care agencies. One critic ex-
plained that "[f]oster care is big business. It keeps thousands of
TICE, supra note 15, at 10-1, 10-1 to 10-20 (explaining the dispositional hearing).
.20. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 786 (stating that federal fund-
ing grew to over $200 million by the late 1970s); see also Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished
Business: The Foster Child's Due Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C. L, REV. 113, 122 n.48 (1990)
(stating that in the 25-year period after the passage of the first federal funding legislation, federal
expenditures increased from a few million dollars annually to $325 million annually).
21. See Oren, supra note 20, at 120 n.42 (explaining the increase in child abuse reports as a
combination of mandatory reporting statutes of child abuse and the "pediatric awakening" which
established that child abuse could be identified through medical examination).
22. Id. at 121-22.
23. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 797; see also H.R. REP. 395, supra
note 5, at 17-24 (reporting that since 1985, the placement rate has surged).
24. In 1989, the government spent over $1 billion on foster care. WEXLER, supra note 14, at
219.
25. See H.R REP. 395, supra note 5, at 8-9 (finding that child services systems are over-
whelmed because foster homes are far too few and excessive caseloads overburden the systems'
ability to provide minimal care and appropriate services); Mushlin, supra note 5, at 212-13 (citing
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF CHILDREN IN NEED OF PARENTS, WHO KNOWS? WHO CARES? FOR-
GOTTEN CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE (1979)) ("Foster care systems are administered by staffs that
are 'overburdened, poorly paid and often unprepared professionally' for the difficult work they are
called upon to perform.").
26. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 787 (stating that a monetary
incentive existed for states to use foster care placements rather than providing preventative or
rehabilitative services).
19921
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:675
people in jobs. It is good business to keep on keeping kids in care. ' '1 7
According to this same critic, if more children are placed in foster
care, the voluntary agencies will be able to "swell their budgets,
staffs and perks by sucking at a $580-million-a-year trough."28
The system also frequently failed to minimize the time children
spent in the custody of the state.29 For example, in 1977, a Depart-
ment of Health Education and Welfare study found that 58 % of all
children in foster care had been there for more than two years and
that their average stay was two and a half years.3" Researchers fur-
ther found that the longer a child stayed in foster care, the less
likely he or she would be able to leave it."' The overall result of this
emphasis on foster care rather than family rehabilitation was that
more children entered the system, stayed longer, and were less likely
to leave it.
In addition to the increase of foster children in the system, the
environment of the system deteriorated. First, many foster children
experienced multiple placements including time in foster homes,
emergency shelters, or. group homes. In 1987, for example, 23.7%
of foster children experienced two placements, 20.1 % of foster chil-
dren experienced three placements, and 6.9% of foster children ex-
perienced four placements. 32 Next, once children entered into foster
care, they were often ignored by the system. For example, many
foster children did not receive a caseworker until after they had
been removed from their homes for as long as three months.33
Where foster children did receive caseworkers, they sometimes had
no contact with them for over a year.3" Finally, many children suf-
27. Carole Agus, Living in Fear; Foster Care Nightmare Gets Worse, NEWSDAY, May 10,
1992, at 3.
28. Id.
29. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 787; see also HR. REP. 395, supra
note 5, at 6 ("There has been no significant progress in reducing the average length of stay of
children in foster care. In 1985, the percentage of children in care more than 2 years stood at
39%, relatively unchanged from 1983.").
30. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 787.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 854; see also H.R. REP. 395, supra note 5, at 6 (finding that "between 1983 and
1985, the number of children placed in foster care more than one time nearly doubled, from 16%
to 30%"); Mushlin, supra note 5, at 208 (stating that stays in four or more foster homes are
common).
33. Deborah Tedford, Double Jeopardy: Child Protective Services in Texas; Lawsuits Seek
Better Children's Care, HOUST. CHRON., Oct. 31, 1991, at Al.
34. Id.
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fered abuse and neglect while in the foster care system. 35 Many
studies show that the rate of abuse is substantially higher in foster
homes than in other homes.36 Although the foster care system was
intended to protect children, abuse prevented realization of this
goal. As one scholar noted: "Children don't go to heaven when they
are removed from their parents. . . .They go to the foster care
system.""7
Traditionally, the state separated children from the home to pro-
tect them from abuse, neglect, or abandonment. It is important,
however, to carefully distinguish between these three concepts. Al-
though no one would deny that abused, neglected, and abandoned
children should be protected from their parents,3 8 these labels often
hide the reality of the situation. Poor children are frequently found
to be "neglected" where their actual harm is minimal. 9 For exam-
ple, parents may be accused of neglecting their children by giving
them money to eat breakfast at McDonalds too often, by letting
them watch television after 7:30 p.m., or by picking a child up from
school late.'" Many legal scholars. and children's advocates argue
that the real meaning of neglect should not encompass such situa-
tions. 1 Such critics of the foster care system contend that many
current foster children have been unnecessarily removed from their
homes because they were "neglected" even though they were not in
any real danger. 2
Moreover, a permanent home in these situations, particularly that
of the biological parents, offers the child a better environment than
long-term foster care.4 3 According to one congressional report, "[i]t
35. H.R. REP. 395, supra note 5, at 39-44 (discussing many instances of abuse of children in
the custody of various states); Mushlin, supra note 5, at 206 (indicating that according to a na-
tional study, foster children, at the highest rates, suffered abuse over ten times more often than
other children); Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Children under a Post-
DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 228-29 n.10 (1990).
36. Sinden, supra note 35, at 229 n.10 (citing DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING 10-11 (1978) and
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FOSTER HOME AND CHILD PROTECTION 63-64 (1981)).
37. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 167.
38. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In this case,
failure to remove a child from his home resulted in his suffering permanent brain damage from his
father's abuse. Id. at 192-93.




43. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 786.
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is generally agreed that it is in the best interest of children to live
with their families."" Children in foster care not only suffer the
personal trauma of separation from family and friends,"4 but also
their absence from a permanent home may harm their social, emo-
tional, and psychological development. 46 Therefore, a child's best in-
terests can often be best protected by staying in her home where
poverty may be the underlying problem. This is especially true in
"neglect" cases47 where the neglect stems from poverty rather than
from the voluntary action of the parents. This type of neglect can be
eliminated by providing children and their parents the necessary re-
sources. Many scholars and advocacy groups argue that the best so-
lution to these problems is to provide the families services so that
they can stay together and work out their problems, rather than sep-
arating them and compounding their problems within the foster care
system.48 This theory is commonly known as "family rehabilitation"
or "family preservation. 49
3. The Illinois Foster Care System
Some states have adopted this approach and reformed their sys-
tems to focus on family rehabilitation.5" Illinois, however, has not
44. Id. at 784.
45. See Mushlin, supra note 5, at 207 (emphasizing the inevitable pain of separation that chil-
dren experience regardless of how terrible the family setting was); Sinden, supra note 35, at 229
n.9 (explaining the harm and feelings of bias a child suffers when removed from a natural parent).
46. Mushlin, supra note 5, at 207.
47. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (discussing the different connotations of
"neglect").
48. Stanley S. Herr, Children Without Homes, Rights to Education and to Family Stability,
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 337, 360 (1990); see THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, STATUS
REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA'S CITIES: 1988, at 3 (1989) (stating that the
emotional and mental health problems of both parents and children are a result of homelessness);
Golubuck, supra note 5, at 1400 ("It makes no sense from a humanitarian or financial standpoint
for children to enter foster care when cash assistance to provide housing and other essentials could
keep the family together."). See generally Brief for American Association for Protecting Children
et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 83-102, Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360
(1992) (No. 90-1488) (arguing that the Adoption Assistance Act was passed in response to the
harmful effects on children from unnecessary foster care placement); Brief of the Illinois State
Bar Association et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 105-110, Suter v. Artist M.,
112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (No. 90-1488) (arguing that DCFS systematically violates the Adoption
Assistance Act by failing to make foster care prevention and family reunification efforts for chil-
dren, thereby causing children substantial and irreparable harm); WEXLER, supra note 14, at 44-
46 (illustrating DCFS's failure to preserve one family).
49. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 250-71.
50. H.R. REP. 395, supra note 5, at 89-95 (discussing the success of family preservation pro-
grams in Washington, Utah, Maryland, Virginia, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Louisiana,
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yet fully implemented such reforms. In Illinois, DCFS has recently
experienced an increase in lawsuits by child welfare advocates in
response to the agency's alleged mismanagement, inadequate num-
ber of caseworkers and foster homes, failure to provide counseling
and medical care for the foster children, and an occasional failure to
keep track of the children in the system. 1 There are currently about
23,000 foster children in DCFS's care; however, many of them have
suffered additional harm since being removed from their homes. 2
In re Ashley K.5 3 provides a compelling illustration of the failures
of DCFS. Ashley, better known as "Sarah" in the newspapers, was
born addicted to heroin. 4 Her parents, who were both addicted to
heroin and cocaine, were unmarried but living together in a troubled
relationship. 5 Her mother occasionally made money to support her
drug habit by prostitution.56 DCFS had previously investigated
Ashley's parents with regard to their two older children and discov-
ered inadequate living conditions. 7
In 1984, because of her mother's drug addiction, DCFS took cus-
tody of Ashley after she was born. Ashley was soon placed with
foster parents who were led to believe that they could eventually
adopt her.58 During the first sixteen months of Ashley's life, her bio-
logical parents visited her three times.59 DCFS tried to rehabilitate
Ashley's parents, but all attempts failed. In 1985, a circuit court
ruled that Ashley's parents were unfit to care for her for reasons
other than financial circumstances.6 Meanwhile, Ashley's develop-
ment seemed to be progressing with her foster parents, despite lin-
gering physical effects from heroin withdrawals." DCFS, however,
which consist of early and intensive family counseling within the home, emergency cash assis-
tance, and caseworkers with very small caseloads).
51. Rob Karwath, D.C. is Chided over Foster Care, Judge Rules Government Must Ade-
quately Provide for Kids, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1991, § 1, at 12; see Rob Karwath, Months after
Kids' Deaths, DCFS Worker Reports They're Fine, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1991, § 1, at 1, 16 [here-
inafter Months after Kids' Deaths] (discussing the mismanagement of DCFS, where one
caseworker had written in a report that she visited three children and reported that they were fine,
when in reality the children had died over two months earlier).
52. Months after Kids' Deaths, supra note 51, at 1, 16.
53. 571 N.E.2d 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
54. Id. at 906.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 907.
58. Id.
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did not try to facilitate an adoption or provide her with a permanent
home. During 1985, Ashley's parents visited her seven times, and
each visit greatly upset Ashley.62 Again in 1986, the state circuit
court declared Ashley's mother unfit, yet DCFS refused to let
Ashley's foster parents adopt her and give her a permanent home.6"
At age three and one half, Ashley still had not received a disposi-
tional hearing as required by the Adoption Assistance Act.64
When Ashley was four years old, her parents finally began re-
sponding to rehabilitation. 65 Numerous psychological reports, how-
ever, recommended that Ashley's foster parents be allowed to adopt
her because she considered them her real parents and their home as
her real home.66 The psychologists' testimony further indicated that
Ashley would suffer severe psychological harm if she was returned
to her biological parents.67 DCFS ignored these recommendations
and continued visitation, which caused Ashley to suffer emotional
and behavioral injuries.66
In June of 1989, after Ashley had been living with her foster par-
ents for five years, the court ordered her to be removed from their
custody.69 Her foster parents were not allowed to visit without the
consent of DCFS.7 0 In 1991, an Illinois appellate court reversed the
circuit court's order because it was "palpably against the manifest
weight of evidence and an abuse of discretion" in light of the psy-
chological testimony of Ashley's best interests.7 1 The appellate court
characterized Ashley's story as "the account of a helpless child
caught in the quagmire of the bureaucratic maze which we mistak-
enly call our child welfare system."' 72 The appellate court ended up
returning Ashley to her biological parents upon her plea to restore
some sort of stability to her life.7 3 Essentially, Ashley was in limbo
62. Id.
63. Id. at 909.
64. Id. at 909-10; see 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988) (requiring a dispositional hearing within
eighteen months after a child is taken into foster care to determine the future status of the child).
65. In re Ashley K., 571 N.E.2d at 910.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 910-11.
69. Id. at 914-915.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 924.
72. Id. at 919.
73. Rob Karwath, Judge Heeds "'Sarah"; Rules for Her Parents, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1991, § 1,
at I (stating that the judge based his decision after a thirteen-day hearing during which he pri-
vately interviewed Ashley); see also Rob Karwath, "Sarah" Case Judge Will Need Wisdom of
[Vol. 42:675
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the first seven years of her life. This lifestyle did not seem to be in
her best interests. 4 If, however, she would have received a disposi-
tional hearing after her first eighteen months in the system, as re-
quired by the Adoption Assistance Act,71 she would not have re-
mained in limbo for so long and could have had a permanent home
with her foster parents much sooner.
B.H. v. Johnson7 6 also paints a "bleak and Dickensian picture of
life under the auspices of the DCFS. '7 7 Six of the named plaintiffs
in this case were brothers and sisters. Their parents locked them in
a bedroom filled with human waste. 8 When DCFS found them,
they were undernourished and were in need of medical attention.
DCFS's only effort at this point was to hire a homemaker to clean
the apartment. 9
By the time DCFS finally removed the children, two of them had
experienced eight different placements in one year.80 In these vari-
ous placements, they were undernourished and physically and sexu-
ally abused. DCFS failed to provide psychological counseling to help
them cope with such abuse. 81 They also were not allowed to sched-
ule weekly visits with their siblings, all of whom lived with the same
family. Furthermore, DCFS failed to finance treatment for two of
the children's special health problems and another's emotional
problems.82 Finally, DCFS failed to adequately reimburse the foster
parents for various expenses; the foster parents thus found it in-
creasingly difficult to provide necessary care for the children.83 The
other named plaintiffs suffered many of the same problems: they
experienced numerous disruptive placements; they did not have any
Solomon to Rule, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1991, § 2, at 1 (stating that although Sarah was removed
from her foster home "kicking and screaming," five years later she told the judge that she wanted
to stay with her biological parents and she covered her eyes and said, "I want it to stop").
74. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-2(3)(c) (1991) (705 ILCS 4051-2 (1992)) (constitut-
ing the Illinois Juvenile Court Act, which created DCFS, and stating that "[t]he parents' right to
the custody of their child shall not prevail when the court determines that it is contrary to the best
interests of the child").
75. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988).
76. 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Il. 1989).
77. Id. at 1389.




82. Id.; see also Mushlin, supra note 5, at 207 (characterizing the foster care system's failure
to provide children with a stable and secure home setting, and medical, psychological, or emo-
tional needs as "program abuse").
83. B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1391.
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counseling to help them deal with their problems; they had infre-
quent contact with their caseworkers; and they even attempted sui-
cide or faked suicide attempts to secure more attention from
DCFS.a4 These children did not receive help until the ACLU finally
sued DCFS to stop some of these abuses. Overall, Ashley K. and
B.H. provide striking examples of the dangers which foster children
face when the foster care system fails to protect them.
B. The Environment of Poor Urban Families
To understand the gravity of the foster care system's problems
with respect to poor families,8" it is necessary to explore the effect of
poverty on families. First, poor families are generally at a higher
risk of losing their children to state intervention. Moreover, where
families lack essentials such as housing, the risk of losing their chil-
dren increases dramatically. To fully understand the plight of poor
families it is necessary to further discuss these two conditions.
1. Disproportionate State Intervention in Poor Families
Poor families as a whole lose their children to the foster care sys-
tem more often than wealthier families. For example, in 1986, fami-
lies with annual incomes of less than $15,000 were reported for
abusing or neglecting their children five time more than other fami-
lies.8" This is partly due to two factors. Since poor families often
depend on the state to provide for many of their daily needs, they
subject themselves to increased state scrutiny. Where they receive
welfare or other federal subsidies, they open up their lives to state
intervention. As a result, family problems become more visible than
84. Id. at 1390.
85. One standard for measuring whether a family is poor or "needy" is whether it qualifies for
AFDC cash assistance. The needs standard is supposed to represent the monthly income amount
that the state has determined necessary for maintenance. Adele M. Blong & Timothy J. Casey,
AFDC Program Rules for Advocates: An Overview, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 802, 806 (1989);
see 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(1), 233.20(a)(2)(i) (1991). However, in many states, including Illi-
nois, the needs standard is less than the poverty level. For example, in Illinois the needs standard
in 1987 for a family of three was $689 per month or $8,268 per year. Lisa VanDeVeer, Adequacy
of Current AFDC Need and Payment Standards, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 141, 144 (1987). The
federal poverty threshold was $9,300, so in 1987 families receiving AFDC still remained 11.4%
below the federal poverty level. Id. at 141-45.
86. Sinden, supra note 35, at 228 n.7 (citing NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEG-
LECT. STUDY FINDINGS: STUDY OF NATIONAL INCIDENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 1988,
at 5-41 (1988)). According to a further study, 48% of all children reported for abuse and neglect
came from families who were receiving public aid. Id. (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1989, at 173 (Table 291) (1989)).
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they are in wealthier families."7 Also, because of their impoverished
conditions, many poor parents are coerced by caseworkers into giv-
ing up their children in order to avoid being labeled "neglectful. ' 8
Poverty often brings added stress which causes more problems
within the family." With the added stress comes less tolerance and
patience to deal with all the complexities of poverty. Consequently,
poor people may be unable to cope passively or to constructively
vent their frustrations. Overall, the frustration of poverty takes its
toll on the relationships within poor families; this may cause the
family to spiral out of control, facilitating state intervention." Poor
parents who seek help from state welfare agencies may give their
children up for temporary care in order to solve their family crisis."1
Once the crisis is resolved, however, most of these parents are una-
ble to get their children back.92
2. Scarce Affordable Housing and Homelessness
The lack of affordable housing is also an increasingly severe prob-
lem for poor families.93 In Chicago, two of every three poor families
must pay more than half of their incomes for housing, leaving them
little money to pay for food, clothing, or health care.94 A lack of
these essentials constitutes a sufficient reason for the state to remove
children from their parents' care.9 ' Therefore, poor families who
risk losing their homes often risk losing their children as well.
A historical look at the evolution of public housing provides a clue
to today's housing problems. In 1937, during the Great Depression,
87. Id.
88. The American Bar Association has reported that coerced "voluntary" placement is a recur-
ring problem. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 119.
89. Sinden, supra note 35, at 228; see also Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the
Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623,
629 n.21 (1976) (explaining that most poor parents on welfare risk being labeled as neglectful
because of their increased exposure to social and welfare workers who are obligated to report
possible child care deficiencies).
90. WExLER, supra note 14, at 47.
91. Id. at 119.
92. Studies have found that almost half of the children who were "voluntarily" placed in foster
care for more than six months never returned home. Id.
93. Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
315, 321 (1990).
94. Patrick T. Reardon, High Housing Costs Overwhelm the Poor, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1991, §
2, at 1.
95. A child is considered neglected when his or her parents fail to provide the proper or neces-
sary support, including adequate food, clothing, and shelter. See supra note 12.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt made a commitment to end housing
indigence;9" this resulted in the National Housing Act.97 In 1949,
Congress renewed this commitment by embarking on a national ur-
ban renewal program.98 Congress vowed to provide "a decent home
in a suitable environment for every American." 99 Next, in 1968,
Congress set a goal to eliminate all substandard housing and fulfill
all the nation's housing needs within ten years.100 During the last
twenty years the incidence of substandard housing has decreased,
but the lack of affordable housing has become a larger problem. 1' 1
In Chicago alone, there are 225 low income families for every 100
low-rent apartments. 2
There are many causes of today's shortage of affordable housing
and the consequent increase in homelessness.' 3 First, much of the
public housing stock has been demolished either intentionally or
through neglect.'0 4 The stock of single-occupancy units in urban ar-
eas has been especially hard hit.'0 5 Next, the government has de-
creased its funding to some housing and income subsidy pro-
grams. 0 6 For instance, in 1987, only 2,200 units of public housing
were started, whereas in 1965, 36,900 units were started and in
1961, 52,000 units were started. 0 7 Between 1979 and 1988, federal
housing outlays dropped from $32 billion to $8 billion.' 08 Finally,
the number of poor people has increased, thus increasing the de-
mand for affordable housing.'09 For example, a recent study by the
Census Bureau showed that 33.6 million people in 1990 lived under
96. Berger, supra note 93, at 320 ("The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the
abundance of those who have too much; it is whether we provide enough for those who have too
little."(quoting President Roosevelt)); Mark Peters, Homelessness: A Historical Perspective on
Modern Legislation, 88 MicH. L. REV. 1209, 1227-28 (1990) (discussing housing legislation of the
early century).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
98. Berger, supra note 93, at 319; see 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988).
99. Berger, supra note 93, at 319-20.
100. Id. at 320; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988) (codifying the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968).
101. Berger, supra note 93, at 320-21.
102. Reardon, supra note 94, at 1-2.
103. See Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271, 280 (1990);
Berger, supra note 93, at 321-23.
104. White, supra note 103, at 280.
105. Berger, supra note 93, at 322 n.42 (reporting that at least half of the single room occu-
pancy units were recently demolished).
106. Id. at 321 n.40, 322 n.45.
107. Id. at 321 n.40.
108. Id. at 322 n.45.
109. Id. at 322-23; White, supra note 103, at 271.
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the poverty line as compared with 31.5 million in 1989 and 29.3
million in 1980.110 Since the economy has become increasingly less
industrialized, more people are employed in lower paying service
jobs."' Accordingly, much of the unskilled labor pool is simply not
making as much money as it used to. As a result, the supply of
affordable housing cannot begin to meet the demand.
Poor urban families are hardest hit by the lack of affordable
housing. 1 2 First, the increase in housing costs makes affordable
shelter scarce for the poor. As previously mentioned, poor people
must spend a disproportionate percentage of their income on hous-
ing. 113 According to the federal government, a family should spend
no more than 30% of its income on housing, but in 1987 a typical
Chicago renter with an income of less than $10,000 spent 68% of
her income on housing.1 ' Consequently, a parent working at mini-
mum wage may be below the poverty line and may not have suffi-
cient income to pay the rent."'
Unfortunately, subsidized housing fails to offer poor families a vi-
able alternative. There are thousands of people on waiting lists to
obtain low-income housing.1 6 Welfare and housing allowances fail
to keep pace with rising rental costs, so federal benefits are inade&-
quate."17 This problem is exacerbated by some states decreasing the
amount of public assistance. In 1991, for example, sixteen states cut
AFDC payments, tightened eligibility, or did both; six states re-
duced general assistance (aid to single adults); and Michigan almost
110. William Neikirk, 13.5% of Americans Now in Poverty, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1991, § 1, at
1.
11l. Berger, supra note 93, at 323 n.49 (showing that between 1980 and 1987, manufacturing
jobs fell from 20.285 million to 19.065 million and that during the same period, service jobs rose
from 17.89 million to 24.196 million).
112. These urban families are largely headed by single female parents; the poverty level within
this type of family unit has grown at an increasing rate. See id. at 323; Herr, supra note 48, at
347 n.52.
113. See Berger, supra note 93, at 317 ("In [1985], the typical poor renter household paid
sixty-five percent of its income for shelter.").
114. Id.; Reardon, supra note 94, at 1.
115. See Berger, supra note 93, at 323 n.50 (showing that minimum wage will not even put the
worker above the poverty line).
116. Telephone Interview with Lou Wallis, Spokesman for the Chicago Housing Authority's
Department of External Affairs (Feb. 7, 1992) (estimating that the waiting list for subsidized
housing is 40,000 people).
117. VanDeVeer, supra note 85, at 141 (explaining that the AFDC program does not include a
provision for states to regularly update their needs standards to reflect the increased cost of liv-
ing); see Berger, supra note 93, at 322 n.47 (describing how federal financial assistance has failed
to adequately deliver recipients from poverty).
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eliminated its general assistance program altogether.118
Once poor families are in this precarious financial situation, they
are more likely to fall behind in rent and thus are more vulnerable
to eviction. When these parents lose their housing, they may lack
the knowledge or assertiveness to compete for scarce charitable
resources.
119
Furthermore, when families lose their housing, both parents and
children suffer many physical and emotional problems. First, home-
less people suffer a greater incidence of disease than do others be-
cause they often do not have health insurance to provide preventive
care. 120 The homeless are also more undernourished than the rest of
society.' They are more vulnerable to violent crimes and death. 22
More generally, they lack the basic physical and emotional necessi-
ties of human life.' 23 They are forced to sleep, eat, clean themselves,
eliminate bodily wastes, and entertain themselves without the secur-
ity or privacy of a home.'2 4 Consequently, life on the street is often
psychologically devastating.125 The stress of poverty, lack of day
care, scarcity of affordable housing, and deprivation of daily essen-
tials often lead to the breakdown of stable family life and prohibit
parents from adequately caring for their children. 126 Due to the seri-
ous nature of this problem, many scholars and advocacy groups ar-
gue that the state should take all possible steps to either assist fami-
lies in keeping their housing or to help them find housing if they
have none.12 7
118. Jason DeParle, California Plan to Cut Welfare May Prompt Others to Follow, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at Al.
119. Herr, supra note 48, at 344; see PETER H. Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 127-28 (1989) (stating that a Chicago homeless study found that over
two-thirds of the homeless people surveyed had not graduated from high school).
120. Pedro J. Greer, Jr., Medical Problems of the Homeless: Consequences of Lack of Social
Policy - A Local Approach, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 407, 411 (1990).
121. Luder et al., Assessment of the Nutritional Status of Urban Homeless Adults, 104 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 451, 455 (1989).
122. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HOMELESSNESS, HEALTH, AND HUMAN NEEDS 41 (1988)
("Homelessness . . . increases the possibility of trauma, especially as a result of physical assault
or rape .... ").
123. Rossl, supra note 119, at 14.
124. Id.
125. See Herr, supra note 48, at 344-45 ("[Homeless children] are a highly vulnerable popula-
tion in terms of death during infancy and early childhood, poor physical health, developmental
disabilities, depression, and other mental disorders.").
126. Sinden, supra note 35, at 228.
127. See notes 41-49 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning and arguments of advo-
cates of family reunification).
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This lack of affordable housing, together with the problems of
DCFS, places poor families in Illinois in a precarious position. Prior
to Norman v. Johnson,128 if poor parents lost their jobs, they would
probably have been unable to afford housing and were likely to be-
come homeless and possibly lose their children to DCFS. 12 Even if
these parents found new jobs, affordable housing was still probably
unavailable, so DCFS would refuse to return their children. Alter-
natively, where parents received AFDC, these payments were often
insufficient to provide adequate housing, so parents still could lose
their children to DCFS and consequently lose their AFDC bene-
fits.' 3 Finally, where a child was taken into DCFS's custody for
reasons other than neglect or poverty, parents receiving AFDC ex-
perienced a similar cut in benefits. Therefore, even if these parents
solved the initial problem that caused the removal of their children,
they were still unlikely to get their children back because they
lacked resources to provide adequate housing. In many instances,
poor parents ended up unable to obtain adequate housing, and their
children remained lost in the foster care system. DCFS, however,
could change this downward spiral for many families by adhering to
the federal mandate of focusing on family reunification rather than
separation.13a
C. Law and Families
To fully understand the situation of foster children and their fam-
ilies, it is necessary to explore their legal rights. The Constitution
and the Adoption Assistance Act'32 represent two important sources
of protection.
128. 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990). This case is discussed later as the basis of this Note.
See infra notes 375-421 and accompanying text (explaining the Norman decision and consent
decree).
129. H.R. REP. No. 395, supra note 5, at 8 (finding that "[hiomelessness was a factor in over
40% of the placements into foster care in New Jersey in 1986, and in 18% of the placements, it
was the sole precipitating cause of placement").
130. Alice Bussiere & James Morales, An Overview of Housing Discrimination Against Fami-
lies With Children, in LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH: REFORMS, TRENDS, AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 336, 338 (1986); Golubuck, supra note 5, at 1394-96; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 606(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1990) (requiring that parents have a dependent child living with them
to be eligible for AFDC benefits).
131. Cf Golubuck, supra note 5 (arguing that cash assistance is a necessary part of reasonable
efforts in achieving family reunification).
132. Since most state foster care systems depend on federal funding under the Adoption Assis-
tance Act, states model their laws on the federal law. For the purposes of this discussion, there is
no significant distinction between state and federal law, thus only federal law is discussed in this
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1. Constitutional Protections of the Family
a. Traditional respect for families
The family holds a special place in constitutional law. According
to legal scholars, the family's integral role in our constitutional sys-
tem is one of the deepest underlying assumptions of our society. 133
Because society adheres so strongly to the notion of family and fam-
ily values, the law reflects such attachments. The Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut,' for example, invalidated a statute which
prohibited the use of contraceptives by both unmarried and married
people.' 35 The majority opinion by Justice Douglas focused primar-
ily on the marriage relationship and the First Amendment's role in
protecting freedom of association and the right to privacy within
such relationships. 3 6 In looking at the Connecticut statute, the ma-
jority concluded, largely out of its respect for autonomy and privacy
within marriage and the family, that the statute impermissibly in-
truded upon the freedom and privacy of the "sacred" relationship of
marriage. 3 Although the concurring Justices refrained from adopt-
ing the majority's analysis, 38 they all agreed that the interests of
Note.
133. E.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 550-51 (11th ed. 1985); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-20, at 1414-15 (2d ed. 1988); Robert Burt, The
Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329 (1979); John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court,
1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978); De-
velopments in the Law - The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1980).
134. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
135. Id. at 480. The director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a licensed
physician appealed after they were arrested and convicted for giving married people information,
instruction, and medical advice about contraceptives. Id.
136. Id. at 482-83. Justice Douglas initially focused on how the First Amendment protects the
freedom of association. Id. at 483. Since the right to free association is protected, the First
Amendment must offer privacy in one's association. Id. He then focused on the intimate relation-
ship of husband and wife as falling within this First Amendment protection. Id. at 485-86.
137. Id. at 485-86. Justice Douglas stated: "Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects." Id. (emphasis added).
138. See id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at
502-07 (White, J., concurring). Justices Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan disagreed with Justice
Douglas's analysis, which found such rights in a penumbra of the First Amendment. They felt
that this analysis restricted the concept of liberty too much. Rather, these Justices found such
rights in the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 486-99. Justice Harlan criticized Justice Douglas's opinion
for unnecessarily restricting the Court's power under the Fourteenth Amendment. He opined that
the incorporation doctrine was artificial and that the Court need not rely upon the Bill of Rights
to find the statute unconstitutional but could do so exclusively through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which stands "on its own bottom." Id. at 499-502. Justice White
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marriage and family should be protected. Griswold illustrates that
the Constitution protects the family via either the First Amendment
right to privacy in one's associations,139 the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 140 or the Constitution as a whole.' 4'
This constitutional protection for families is not limited to the
traditional notion of a nuclear family."4 2 In Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,4" the Supreme Court invalidated a housing ordinance
which basically defined "family" as "husband or wife of the nominal
head of the household," "unmarried children" of the nominal head
of the household as long as such unmarried children did not have
children, or "father or mother" of the nominal head of the house-
hold."4 The appellant, her son, and two grandsons (who were cous-
ins) did not constitute a "family" under such a statute so the appel-
lant was convicted of violating the ordinance 43 by merely living
with her two grandsons. 46 By invalidating the statute, the Supreme
Court reinforced the notion that the family is honored and protected
agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause was the more appropriate safeguard
of such rights. Id. at 502-07.
139. Justice Douglas stated that although the First Amendment did not specifically guarantee
such rights and freedoms, the First Amendment had a "penumbra" where marital privacy is pro-
tected from government intrusion. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83. Justice Douglas explained that
the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments created zones of privacy via their specific guaran-
tees and that these zones of privacy encompass privacy for married couples in their decisions
regarding procreation. Id. at 485-86.
140. Justices Harlan and White believed that the Fourteenth Amendment stood on its own to
protect the right of privacy within marriage. Id. at 500, 502 (Harlan, J., concurring). This was
one of the rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 501.
141. Justices Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan found that the entire fabric of the Constitution
guarantees as fundamental the rights to marital privacy and to raise a family. Id. at 486-99
(Goldberg, J., concurring). They specifically looked to the Ninth Amendment to protect such
rights. Id. at 496 (referring to the Ninth Amendment which states: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.").
142. The meaning of the word "family" most commonly refers to groups of persons consisting
of parents and children; father, mother and their children; immediate kindred, constituting the
fundamental social unit in civilized society. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 604 (6th ed. 1990); see
People v. Hasse, 291 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1968) (discussing several different defini-
tions of "family").
143. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
144. Id. at 496 (citing the section of the Housing Code of East Cleveland, Ohio that limits the
occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 495-97. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute claiming that it
violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court stated that since the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it did not have to analyze the appellant's equal protection claim. Id.
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because of its roots in the country's history and tradition.147 Since
the extended relationships between grandparents, aunts, uncles, and
cousins played a large role in the history and tradition of the family,
the Court held that constitutional protection extends to these rela-
tionships as well. 14 8 Consequently, Moore demonstrates that the Su-
preme Court is willing to protect a wider range of associations than
that of the nuclear family.' 49
b. Constitutional protection against unwarranted state interference
In accordance with the constitutional protection afforded families,
the law establishes a rebuttable presumption that parents are best
equipped, and have the primary right, to take care of their chil-
dren.' 50 Therefore, when the state interferes with choices made
within family relationships, it has a significantly increased burden to
justify such interference.' 5' Prince v. Massachusetts,' for example,
147. Id. at 499-503 (finding a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter"). The
Court relied on a line of Supreme Court cases in reaching its conclusion: Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923) (recognizing a person's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
marry, establish a home, and bring up children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (holding that parents have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to direct the up-
bringing and education of their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)
(recognizing parents' Fourteenth Amendment due process interests in rearing their children); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972) (emphasizing parents' constitutionally protected
right to exclusively control and guide their children's religious beliefs); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (finding that a parent had a constitutionally protected interest in the com-
panionship, care, and custody of children). Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-503.
148. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05.
Over the years millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an environment,
and most, surely, have profited from it. Even if conditions of modern society have
brought about a decline in extended family households, they have not erased the accu-
mulated wisdom of civilization, gained over centuries and honored throughout our
history, that supports a larger conception of the family.
Id.
149. See TRIBE, supra note 133, § 15-20, at 1419-20 (discussing the Court's willingness to
protect intimate relationships beyond the nuclear family).
150. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family rests on
a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity forjudgment required for making life's difficult decisions."); I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *447 (stating that the law has historically recognized that 'natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children).
151. TRIBE, supra note 133, § 15-20, at 1417-20. Tribe discusses the fact that despite the im-
portance of parental rights, such rights are not unlimited. For example, state interference may be
justified where the child's welfare trumps family autonomy in a situation where parents fail to
bring "'obedient social conformance from their children.'" Id. at 1417 (quoting Burt, supra note
133, at 339-40); cf. AMERICAN LAW Div. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 4-5 (Comm. Print
1978) (explaining that the law defers to parental authority unless a compelling justification for
694
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illustrates this conflict between state interference and family auton-
omy. In Prince, the legal guardian of a nine-year-old child violated
a labor law153 by allowing her to distribute religious literature on
the street.1 5 " Although the Court recognized the aunt's parental in-
terest in rearing her niece,' 55 it also recognized the state's power to
limit parental freedom and authority when a child's welfare is im-
pacted. 156 After weighing the state's interests157 against the legal
guardian's parental interests,1 58 the Court concluded that the law
was necessary to accomplish the state's legitimate goals and conse-
quently did not constitute an abuse of the state's power.1 59
Another conflict between state and family emerged in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,' 60 where the Supreme Court held that the state could not
force Amish parents to keep their children in public school until the
age of sixteen. 1' Yoder differs from Prince in that the Amish par-
ents established a strong interest in exclusively controlling their chil-
dren because such control was necessary to further their religious
beliefs." 2 Therefore, the Court found that the parents' interest out-
weighed the state's. 3
interference exists).
152. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
153. Id. at 160-61. The Massachusetts labor law prohibited boys under twelve and girls under
eighteen from "sell[ing], expos[ing] or offer[ing] for sale any newspapers, magazines or periodi-
cals ...in any street or public place." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 166 ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder.").
156. Id. at 166-67 (equating a legal guardian with a parent).
157. Massachusetts stated that its interest was to secure the healthy, well-rounded growth of its
young people by eliminating child employment in public places. Id. at 168.
158. The aunt argued that the law violated, among other things, her parental right to bring up
the child as she saw fit. Id. at 164.
159. Id. at 170. The standard applied sounded like intermediate scrutiny, yet the Court merely
deferred to the state's label that the statute was "necessary" to accomplish legitimate state goals.
Id. The Court focused more on the fact that the statute only applied to distributing literature on
public streets, so parental rights were not overly burdened by it. Id.
160. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
161. Id. at 234.
162. Id. at 215-20. The court pointed out that "there are areas of conduct protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the state to control,
even under regulations of general applicability." Id. at 220.
163. Id. at 234-35.
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c. Constitutional rights to the management and companionship of
children
The Constitution protects the family primarily by upholding par-
ents' rights to the management and companionship of their children.
For instance, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1  the Court held that
parents have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to raise
and educate children under their control.165 There, the Supreme
Court invalidated an amendment to Oregon's school law which re-
quired parents and guardians to send their children to Oregon's
public schools.1 66 Since the law hampered the parents' free choice to
decide where to educate their children, and no evidence showed that
parochial schools were inferior, the state was without sufficient justi-
fication to interfere with the parents' Fourteenth Amendment
freedoms. 67
Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska,68 the Supreme Court recog-
nized parents' Fourteenth Amendment due process right to raise
their children.' 69 In this case, Nebraska enacted a statute which
prohibited the teaching of any language other than English in public
and parochial schools. 170 The Court found that the statute unconsti-
tutionally interfered with the Fourteenth Amendment rights of par-
ents to have their children instructed as they chose.17 1 Parham v.
J.R.12 offers a final illustration of the Court's willingness to protect
parents' constitutional rights to manage their children. There, the
Court granted parents broad authority within the family setting by
upholding a law that gave parents virtually exclusive power to com-
164. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.").
165. Id.
166. Id. at 522.
167. See id. at 533-35 (explaining that the state simply did not establish the need for such a
statute so the legislation had "no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the State").
168. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
169. Id. at 399.
170. Id. at 399-400.
171. Id. at 400-02. The Court warned against the dangers in restricting the liberty granted by
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, for example, compared this law with Plato's theory in the
Republic where "children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child
his parent." Id. at 401-02. It then concluded that such state control would violate the letter and
the spirit of the Constitution. Id. at 402. The Court also found that the statute violated the plain-
tiff teacher's Fourteenth Amendment right. Id.
172. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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mit their children to mental hospitals.17 The Pierce, Meyer, and
Parham decisions thus indicate that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause constitutes a liberal guarantee of parents' rights
to manage their children. 7
The Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees a parent's right to
companionship with his or her children. In Stanley v. Illinois,1 75 the
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois adoption statute that ignored
an unwed father's interest in his child.1 76 In reaching its conclusion,
the Court stated that the parent has an interest in the companion-
ship, care, and custody of the child, which "undeniably warrants
deference" and protection "absent a powerful countervailing inter-
est."' 77 One Illinois court similarly expressed: "[T]he bond between
the parents and the child is the deepest feelings of the heart.' 78
Courts also acknowledge that keeping the family together helps pro-
mote the child's best interests.1 79 Therefore, both law and social re-
search 80 support the conclusion that parent-child companionship
should be preserved whenever possible.
It is necessary again at this point to emphasize the view which
argues against the unquestioned legitimacy of parental authority.' 81 .
For example, where parents fail to adequately care for their child,
as in the case of abuse, the courts will remove the child from the
home and place the child in the state's custody. Therefore, the Con-
stitution does not protect abusive parents. However, when poverty
enters the picture, the state often mistakenly views children as ne-
173. Id. at 603-04. Even though the Court recognized the child's liberty interest, it held that
the parents' interest superseded it. Id. at 604.
174. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (extending the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the parental rights of the father of an illegitimate child).
175. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
176. Id. at 658-59. The statute's narrow definition of parents as the "mother and father of a
legitimate child" ignored any rights of the child's unwed father. Id. at 650.
177. Id. at 651 (focusing on the "warm, enduring, and important" bonds within the family
regardless of whether it's a formal, organized unit).
178. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 105 N.E.2d 117 (Il1. App. Ct. 1952); see Washburn v. Washburn,
122 P.2d 96 (Cal. 1942) (observing that there is no substitute for a mother's love); Moody v.
Moody, 211 So. 2d 842, 844 (Miss. 1968) (observing that parents will love and care for their
children accordingly).
179. People v. R.G., 546 N.E.2d 533, 541 (Ill. 1989). "It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply or hinder." Id. (citing Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
180. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text (explaining the destructive effects on a
child who is removed from his or her parent).
181. Burt, supra note 133, at 351.
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glected.' 82 Unfortunately, the Constitution fails to offer protection
in such instances, even where the parents have not harmed their
children. Accordingly, the impoverished families damaged by the
state's misinterpretation must often look elsewhere for legal
protection.
2. The Adoption Assistance Act
a. Legislative history
In 1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance Act' 83 in re-
sponse to the many problems of the nation's foster care system. The
legislative history reflects Congress's attempt to reform the welfare
system and respond to the many problems which plagued it.""
When Congress passed the Act, the country's foster care system was
extremely overcrowded, and many children who did not belong in
the system languished there.185 Congress found that child services
systems were overwhelmed: permanent homes were far and few be-
tween, and excessive caseloads overburdened the systems' ability to
provide minimal care and appropriate services.' 86 Vice President
Walter Mondale stated: "Too often children who could be placed
with permanent families remain in foster care because the special
help to make these children adoptable simply is not available ....
Often, children are simply swallowed up in the system .... .8 In
response, Congress passed the Act with the intent of keeping chil-
dren out of foster care where they could be safe at home with the
appropriate services. For example, Senator Cranston stated:
In the past, foster care has often been the first option selected when a family
is in trouble. . . . Far too many children and families have been broken
apart when they could have been preserved with a little effort. Foster care
182. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (demonstrating the state's frequent labeling
of poverty as neglect).
183. Child Welfare and Adoption Assistance Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-03, 608, 612, 620-
625, 627-628, 655, 658, 670-676, 1305, 1308, 1318, 1320b2-3, 1382d, 1395y, 1395cc, 1397,
1397a-e (1988 & Supp. 1991).
184. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS. supra note 3, at 787-88; H.R. REP. No. 136, 96th
Cong., ist Sess. 48-49 (1979); 125 CONG. REC. 22,679-22,682 (1979) (statement of Sen. Cran-
ston); 123 CONG. REC. 24,861 (1977) (statement of Sen. Cranston); see supra notes 20-49 and
accompanying text (detailing the problems of the national foster care system).
185. See supra notes 20-49 and accompanying text (describing the problems of the foster care
system which precipitated the Act).
186. H.R. REP. 395, supra note 5, at 8-9.
187. 123 CONG. REC. 24,861 (1977) (statement of Vice-Pres. Mondale).
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ought to be a last resort rather than the first.188
To resolve the problem of unnecessary placement, Congress in-
cluded a provision which stated that the state must make reasonable
efforts to keep families together before removing children from their
homes. According to Senator Cranston:
[Tihe new provisions will require States to examine alternatives and pro-
vide, wherever feasible, home-based services that will help keep families to-
gether, or help reunite families. Of course, State child protective agencies
will continue to have authority to remove immediately children from dan-
gerous situations, but . . . these agencies will be required to provide such
services before removing the child and turning to foster care. These provi-
sions, I believe, are among the most important aspects of this legislation.8"
In light of such clear congressional intent, it appears that the
Act's reasonable efforts provision was created so that states would
provide services to prevent children from being unnecessarily re-
moved from their homes. However, if families are unable to enforce
such services, this provision would seem to be a dead letter.
b. The Act
The Adoption Assistance Act restructured the Social Security
Act's program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children19 °
(AFDC) in an attempt to prevent children from being removed un-
necessarily from their parents. 9 To achieve this goal, Congress
188. 126 CONG. REC. 6942 (1980); see 125 CONG. REC. 22,117 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Ros-
tenkowski) ("In a majority of the cases, there are little or no attempts to reunite the child with the
natural family.").
189. 126 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1980) (emphasis added); see 126 CONG. REC. 14,645 (1980)
(remarks of Reps. Conable and Rousselot); 125 CONG. REC. 22,116, 22,119 (1979) (remarks of
Reps. Chisholm and Dodd).
190. AFDC is a "federal-state means-tested income support program under which the states
provide monthly or bi-monthly cash grants for basic maintenance to some groups of 'needy' fami-
lies with 'dependent children' and the federal government reimburses the states for 50-80 percent
of their program costs." Blong & Casey, supra note 85, at 802. To be eligible for AFDC, a person
must be a U.S. citizen or a legal alien; must have a dependent child living with her or be a relative
of a child who is in her care; and must meet the financial eligibility requirements of the state in
which she receives the payments. Id. In addition to cash grants, AFDC has other programs, such
as job training and day care. Id.; see also Diane Redleaf, Illinois Child-Care Disregard Litiga-
tion: Modest Consolation for the Working Poor, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375 (1985). AFDC
payments, however, have not been adequate with respect to the rising cost of living. VanDeVeer,
supra note 85, at 142.
191. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 788; see Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 601 (1988) (authorizing federal funds for the states under AFDC "[for the purpose of
encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes . . . strengthen[ing] family life
and to help such parent or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support
1992]
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conditioned federal funding for state foster care systems on the
states' compliance with the Act's policies and procedures. 9 ' The
stated policy of the Act is to prevent unnecessary separation of fam-
ilies193 by keeping or restoring children to their families through
child welfare services. 94  To achieve this goal, the Act requires
reunification programs, 95 case plans, 96 reasonable efforts to reunify
the family, 9 7 a case review system, 198 written notice to parents
when the agency denies them any benefits,' 99 and coordination of
programs which will promote child and family welfare. 00 Although
the policy underlying the Act focuses on the need to protect children
and to secure their best interests, largely by stressing family reunifi-
cation, the Act's potential has not been fully realized.'' Unfortu-
and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and pro-
tection ...."); see also S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1967), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834, 2837-38 (describing how the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram would be changed to provide more incentives for parents to find employment).
192. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 671 (1991); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(B),(C)(1988) (conditioning
the state's receipt of federal funds on its implementation of a case review system and a service
program "designed to help children, where appropriate, to return to families from which they have
been removed").
193. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(1)(C) (1988); see 42 U.S.C. § 627(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)
(conditioning the state's level of funding on the fact that it "has implemented a preplacement
preventive service program designed to help children remain with their families").
194. 42 U.S.C. § 625(a)(l)(D) (1988); see 42 U.S.C. § 627(a)(2)(C) (1988) (requiring the
state to implement "a service program designed to help children, where appropriate, return to
families from which they have been removed").
195. 42 U.S.C. § 627(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (conditioning the state's continued level of
funding on its implementation of an information system which tells the location and goals for each
child in the system, a case review system which acts as a procedural safeguard to ensure that
children's rights are being properly reviewed and evaluated, and a service program designed to
help children-return to their families, when appropriate).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 675(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (defining a
case plan as a written document including "[a] description of the type of home in which a child is
to be placed," a "discussion of the appropriateness of the placement," a plan that assures the child
is receiving proper care, a plan that assures that the state is trying to improve the conditions of the
child's home so that the child can return, and the child's health and education records).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 627(a)(2)(B), 671(a)(16), 675(5) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (mandating and
defining a case review system as a procedure for assuring that each child has a case plan designed
to achieve placement in the most family-like setting, that the status of the child is reviewed at
least every six months, that each child receives a hearing to determine the future status of the
child within eighteen months after the child enters the foster care system, and that each child's
health and education records are reviewed).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 622(b)(2) (1988), 671 (a)(4) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (requiring coordina-
tion of different funding provisions under the Social Security Act to maximize the resources
needed to keep families together).
201. See supra notes I & 2 and accompanying text (explaining Congress's goal in passing the
Act); see also 126 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Cranston). "The new provisions
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nately, "the American foster care system has developed a remarka-
ble immunity to reform. 20 2
c. Judicial interpretation of the Adoption Assistance Act
Generally, courts have held that the Adoption Assistance Act and
its regulations create enforceable rights20 3 for foster children in
states which accept federal assistance.2 0 4 They have upheld the spe-
cific statutory rights to case plans, a case review system, and dispo-
sitional hearings.20 5 In both Lynch v. Dukakis20 6 and B.H. v. John-
son,20 7 children brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming that
the state failed to comply with the Adoption Assistance Act. 08 In
Lynch, the First Circuit held that the state's failure to comply with
the case plan and review requirements violated the plaintiffs' en-
forceable rights under the statute.2 0 9 The court reasoned that the
Act did create enforceable rights because Congress did not intend to
will require States to examine alternatives and provide, wherever feasible, home-based services
that will help keep families together, or help reunite families. .... These provisions, I believe, are
among the most important aspects of this legislation." Id.
202. Mushlin, supra note 5, at 212.
203. Under the Civil Rights Act, section 1983 gives an injured person the right to sue where
she was deprived of a right guaranteed by a federal statute. Section 1983 specifically states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see THOMAS 1. EMERSON & DAVID HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 79-87 (2d ed. 1958) (explaining the origin and application of a
section 1983 action).
204. See, e.g., Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp.
1387 (N.D. II1. 1989); In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638 (Del. 1986). The Burns court held that where
the Division of Child Protective Services did not furnish meaningful case plans or make reasona-
ble efforts to reunify the family as mandated in the Delaware statutes, it violated due process. Id.
at 644-49. Although the Delaware Supreme Court did not provide a detailed discussion, it none-
theless protected the foster children's statutory entitlement. Id.
205. See Vermont Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs. v. United States Dep't of Health and
Human Servs., 798 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1986) (granting the right to a dispositional hearing); Lynch
v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983) (upholding the right to a case plan and review); B.H. v.
Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. I11. 1989) (granting the right to a case plan and review).
206. 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983).
207. 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. 111. 1989); see also Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002
(N.D. I11. 1989) (illustrating a section 1983 action brought by foster children challenging the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Service's practice of placing siblings in separate foster
homes and denying them the opportunity to visit their sisters and brothers).
208. Lynch, 719 F.2d at 506; B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1392.
209. Lynch, 719 F.2d at 511-12.
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close "the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals
"9210most directly affected by the administration of its program.
Likewise, the court in B.H. recognized the enforceable right to a
case plan and case review system because the Act specifically man-
dated such affirmative obligations.211
Finally, in Vermont Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services v. Bowen,1 12 the Second Circuit read the provisions requir-
ing a dispositional hearing as specifically demanding state compli-
ance.213 Since Vermont's statutory scheme failed to provide disposi-
tional hearings 214 within eighteen months of each child's original
placement in the foster care system (as required by statute),1 5 the
state did not satisfy the federal requirements for funding.21 6 Conse-
quently, the Second Circuit upheld the Grant Appeal Board's deci-
sion to deny federal reimbursement for Vermont's foster care sys-
tem.21 7 According to Lynch, B.H., and Bowen, courts are willing to
create enforceable rights under the Adoption Assistance Act where
the Act specifically mandates the state to fulfill well-defined affirma-
tive obligations.1 8
Courts are reluctant, however, to include as enforceable rights
broad and vague benefits not specifically defined in the Adoption
Assistance Act. For a right to be enforceable under a statute, Con-
210. Id. at 510.
211. B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1402 (focusing on the narrow and specific nature of the case plan
and case review provisions and emphasizing that "plaintiffs' entitlement to a . . . case plan does
not give rise to the [other] sweeping rights asserted by plaintiffs").
212. 798 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1986).
213. Id. at 63.
214. The dispositional hearing is a hearing which determines the future status of a child. 42
U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1988); see also ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 37, para. 801-3(6) (1991) (705 ILCS
405/1-3 (1992)) (defining a dispositional hearing as "a hearing to determine whether a minor
should be adjudged to be a ward of the court, and to determine what order of disposition should
be made in respect to a minor adjudged to be a ward of the court"). The purpose of the disposi-
tional hearing is basically to determine whether it is in the minor's best interest to be removed
from the home and made a ward of the state. Riggs, supra note 19, at 10-15.
215. Vermont Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs., 798 F.2d at 60.
216. Id. at 65.
217. Id. Although the court does not specifically state the implication of its holding, by af-
firming the Grant Appeal Board's decision, it seems that the Vermont foster care system lost its
federal funding for that fiscal year. Id.
218. The Supreme Court recently ruled on the issue of the enforceable rights embodied in the
Act in Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992). Although the Court ruled specifically on the
"reasonable efforts" for family rehabilitation provision in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988), in dicta
the Court suggested that a state plan might be the only enforceable right under the Act. Artist
M., 112 S. Ct. at 1367. Consequently, Artist M. may threaten the holdings in Lynch, Dukakis,
and B.H. See supra notes 203-18 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions which have
been held to create enforceable rights).
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gress must have unambiguously created such a right. 19 For exam-
ple, the Eleventh Circuit in Taylor v. Ledbetter2 " refused to recog-
nize a foster child's claim for gross negligence against a caseworker
under the Adoption Assistance Act. 22 ' The caseworker in Taylor
placed the foster child in a home where the foster mother willfully
struck, shook, threw down, beat, and otherwise severely abused the
child.22 As a result of this abuse, the child fell into a coma.223 Al-
though the court found that the plaintiff had a constitutional rem-
edy, it refused to hold that the Adoption Assistance Act contained
the "right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain. '"224
Likewise, in Lesher v. Lavrich,2 25 the Sixth Circuit held that the
Adoption Assistance Act did not embody the statutory right to chal-
lenge the decision of a juvenile court or the right to damages.2 In
Lesher, parents sought to use the state's failure to provide preven-
tive services under the Adoption Assistance Act to nullify a prior
decision of the juvenile court and get damages.227 Although the
Sixth Circuit suggested that the Adoption Assistance Act does pro-
vide statutory rights as in the case of Lynch v. Dukakis, it con-
cluded that no rights existed there.228
In re J.S.229 provides a further illustration of courts' reluctance to
expand the statutory rights embodied in the Adoption Assistance
Act. There, a child in the state's custody claimed that the Adoption
Assistance Act mandated that a change in a child's case plan be
approved by the case review board.2 30 The court disagreed, narrowly
limiting the provisions concerning case plans and review. It con-
cluded that the state was only obligated to an eighteen-month re-
view of case plans, not to a review every time the plan was
changed.23' Taylor, Lesher, and In re J.S. indicate that courts seem
willing to grant statutory rights under the Adoption Assistance Act
219. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
220. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987).
221. Id. at 800.
222. Id. at 792.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 794.
225. 784 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1986).
226. Id. at 197-98.
227. Id. at 194.
228. Id. at 197.
229. In re J.S., 571 A.2d 658 (Vt. 1989).
230. Id. at 660.
231. Id. at 663.
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only where a specific provision requires the state to fulfill concrete
obligations.232
Just as some courts refuse to extend the rights in the Adoption
Assistance Act, other courts refuse to interpret broad and vague
rights even if specifically granted by the Act.213 The Adoption Assis-
tance Act states, in pertinent part, that "[i]n order for a State to be
eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan . . . which
...provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made" to
prevent the separation of families (the reasonable efforts provi-
sion).2"" Although some lower courts found that the Adoption Assis-
tance Act contained the enforceable right to reasonable efforts for
family reunification,235 the United States Supreme Court recently
overruled such decisions in Suter v. Artist M.23 6
In Artist M., the agency which runs the Illinois foster care sys-
tem, DCFS, failed to promptly assign caseworkers or reassign
caseworkers when the original caseworkers left.237 The District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois classified such actions as
a failure to make reasonable efforts in reunifying the family.2 38 The
district court then concluded, by equating this reunification right
with a foster child's right to a case plan and review, that the plain-
tiffs had a statutorily protected right to reasonable efforts from
DCFS.23 9 The district court rejected the arguments that the reason-
able efforts mandate was too vague and that Congress did not in-
tend to confer such rights.24 0 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld
232. But see infra text accompanying notes 243-70 (exploring the issue of whether the reasona-
ble efforts provision, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988), imposes concrete obligations on the states).
233. See In re Cynthia, 514 A.2d 360, 365 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986); see also Aristotle P. v.
Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. I11. 1989) (holding that the Act did not create an en-
forceable right to reasonable efforts); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(same).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
235. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nora., Suter v. Artist
M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992); Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. I11. 1990); see also In
re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 648-49 (Del. 1986) (concluding that the state had failed to comply with
the Act's reasonable efforts provision); In re M.H., 444 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989)
(finding that the state did not make reasonable efforts to keep a family together before placing the
children in foster homes); In re Kenny F., 786 P.2d 699, 702 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing
the reasonable efforts mandate); In re S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 127-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (decid-
ing that a state agency had not made reasonable efforts as required by the Act).
236. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
237. Id. at 1364.
238. Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 695 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 980 (7th
Cir. 1990), rev'd sub norn., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
239. Id.
240. Id. The court stated: "Courts have long proved themselves adequate to the task of enforc-
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the district court's conclusions and thus approved the child's right to
enforce the reasonable efforts provision."" The Supreme Court,
however, reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision.242
DCFS appealed the Seventh Circuit's decision, claiming that
there is no enforceable federal right to reasonable efforts under the
Adoption Assistance Act, 43 so there would not be a section 1983
cause of action. 24"  DCFS primarily relied on Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman,46 which stated that if Congress
intended for federal funding statutes like the Adoption Assistance
Act to create individually enforceable obligations on the states, then
such rights must have been clearly expressed by Congress.246 DCFS
argued that Congress did not clearly mandate reasonable efforts as
a new standard.247 DCFS further claimed that Congress intended
child welfare law to remain in state, not federal, courts so no feder-
ally enforceable rights were created.248 Since Congress did not
clearly intend to mandate reasonable efforts, DCFS argued, it did
not create an enforceable right to reasonable efforts under section
1983.249 Finally, DCFS contended that even if the federal right to
reasonable efforts exists, Congress foreclosed section 1983 as a rem-
edy because the Adoption Assistance Act calls for the state to de-
ing contractual 'best efforts' obligations, and they equally regularly enforce commitments of par-
ties to conduct themselves 'reasonably.' No reason appears to treat [the Adoption Assistance
Act's] statutorily-created contract any differently." Id. n.6.
241. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 988.
242. Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
243. A section 1983 action does not apply where 1) the statute does not create any enforceable
rights, privileges, or immunities or 2) Congress has foreclosed the enforcement of the statute in
the enactment itself by providing an enforcement mechanism within the statute. Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987); see Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n,
496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990). See generally Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (explaining
that section 1983 provides a cause of action for violation of federal statutes).
244. Brief for Petitioners at 14, Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (No. 90-1488); see
also Linda P. Campbell, DCFS Seeks Relief from Suits in U.S. Courts, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1991,
§ 2, at 4 (reporting DCFS's claim that the Act was too unclear and vague to create a federal
right); Linda P. Campbell & William Grady, Suing to Keep Kids, Families Together, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 1, 1991, § 2, at 1, 5 (reciting DCFS's claim that the "reasonable efforts" language is too
vague to create a federal right).
245. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
246. Id. at 17, 23-25; see Brief for Petitioners at 16, Artist M. (No. 90-1488).
247. Brief for Petitioners at 22. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, DCFS argued
that when Congress adopted the Act, Congress understood that states would need a degree of
flexibility in administering the Act and so did not make "reasonable efforts" an enforceable right.
Family Law: Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act; Private Cause of Action, 60 U.S.L.W.
3427 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Family Law].
248. Brief for Petitioners at 32.
249. Id.
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cide such issues.25 Therefore, DCFS insisted that the elements of a
section 1983 claim were not met.
The Cook County Public Guardian's Office,251 representing the
rights of foster children, argued that the "inquiry turns on whether
the provision in question was intended to benefit the putative plain-
tiff." '252 If such a benefit was intended, then it constituted an en-
forceable right unless it was too vague and amorphous for a court to
interpret. 253  According to the Public Guardian's Office, federal
courts often have to interpret reasonableness requirements in differ-
ent statutes,2 5' and the reasonable efforts provision of the Adoption
Assistance Act is no different. Moreover, they argued that the his-
tory of the Adoption Assistance Act clearly reflects Congress's in-
tent to create the enforceable right of "reasonable efforts. 255 They
asserted that the congressional record illustrates Congress's intent to
instill affirmative duties in the Act 25 and that the Act's regulations
provide guidance for federal courts to determine whether the state
satisfied its burden.2 57
Finally, they argued that since the role of the state courts is not
to supervise DCFS's efforts to return foster children to their home,
the Act does not foreclose a section 1983 remedy. 58 Moreover, even
though the Act states that the federal government has the genera-
250. Id. at 40-41; see 42 U.S.C. § 672(a) (1988) (describing states' foster care maintenance
programs).
251. The Office of the Public Guardian provides guardians ad litem (GAL) for abused and
neglected children. Its role is to represent the best interests of the child in the temporary custody
hearing, the dispositional hearing, and where the child's parents' rights are terminated. See
Lowder, supra note 15, at 12-1.
252. Brief for Respondents at 10, Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (No. 90-1488).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g. Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 111 S. Ct. 880 (1991); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S.
570 (1971); Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); see also Family
Law, supra note 247, at 3428 (illustrating the Justices' concerns during oral argument with the
issue of federal courts' abilities to interpret reasonableness standards).
255. Brief for Respondents at 32, Artist M. (No. 90-1488).
256. Id.; see 126 CONG. REc. 14,767 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston) ("These very genera-
lized provisions have had little specific impact upon a State's responsibility to provide services
designed to prevent a child's removal from his or her home, or to help alleviate the problem which
caused the child's removal in the first place.").
257. Brief for Respondents at 32-33, Artist M. (No. 90-1488); see 45 C:F.R. §§ 1356.21(b),
1357.15(e)(2) (1983) (establishing specific services which a state may provide to satisfy the rea-
sonable efforts requirement).
258. Brief for Respondents at 36, Artist M. (No. 90-1488). But see Family Law, supra note
247, at 3429 (quoting Justice Souter, who reminded the Office of the Public Guardian that ulti-




lized power to cut off funds where the state does not comply with
the Act,259 the Public Guardian's Office argued that this fact also
does not foreclose a section 1983 remedy. 60 It concluded that noth-
ing should preclude foster children from bringing section 1983
claims to enforce the reasonable efforts provision of the Adoption
Assistance Act.
The Supreme Court agreed with DCFS and found that there was
not an enforceable right to reasonable efforts for family reunifica-
tion because Congress did not "unambiguously" confer such a
right.2"' It relied on Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and
Housing Authority262 and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Associa-
tion268 as authority as to whether or not a reasonable efforts provi-
sion is enforceable. 64 The Court then distinguished the Adoption
Assistance Act's reasonable efforts provision from the statutory pro-
visions in Wright and Wilder, on the grounds that it was too
vague.26 5 Although the dissent argued that the language of all three
reasonable efforts provisions was extremely similar, 6 6 the majority
nonetheless concluded that the Adoption Assistance Act's provision
was more generalized and less specific than the provisions in Wright
and Wilder.26 7 The Court further justified its conclusion by stating
that the legislative history did not contradict its holding. 68 Finally,
the Court reasoned that foster children and their families were not
entirely left without a remedy because the federal government could
still withdraw federal funds if the states failed to comply with the
Act.26 9 Although the dissent argued that cutting off federal aid to
the state would not be a viable remedy, 70 as it stands, foster chil-
dren and their families have no right to expect that the state will try
to keep them together prior to splitting their families apart.
Despite the outcome of Artist M., the reasonable efforts provision
259. 42 U.S.C. § 671(b) (1988).
260. Brief for Respondents at 37, Artist M. (No. 90-1488); see Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n,
496 U.S. 498 (1990).
261. Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992).
262. 479 U.S. 418 (1987) (finding an enforceable right to a reasonable amount of utilities).
263. 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (finding an enforceable right to reasonable and adequate rates).
264. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1366-69.
265. Id. at 1367-68.
266. Id. at 1371-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267. Artist M., 112 S.Ct. at 1370.
268. Id. at 1369.
269. Id. at 1368.
270. Id. at 1376-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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may still contain some life in Illinois. As a result of some Illinois
decisions, DCFS has entered into a number of consent decrees271 in
which it agreed to comply with the form and substance of the Adop-
tion Assistance Act.2 72 The consent decrees may dictate DCFS's
policy even though foster children will not have the right to sue to
force them to make reasonable efforts.2 73
d. The Act's importance with respect to other laws affecting foster
children and their families
The effect of the Adoption Assistance Act on the lives of foster
children is even more important considering the lack of other
sources of legal rights. First, children often do not receive full con-
stitutional protection.2 74 For example, in Parham v. J.R.,2 75 the Su-
preme Court subverted the rights of children to parental authority.
As previously discussed, the Parham Court gave parents the unilat-
eral power to institutionalize their children. 76 Likewise, in Goss v.
Lopez177 and Ingraham v. Wright,2 78 the Supreme Court subverted
271. For a discussion of consent decrees, see 47 AM. JUR.2D Judgments §§ 1080-1097 (1969 &
Supp. 1991). Consent decrees have attributes of both judgments, because they are entered into as
a result of litigation, and contracts, because they are a mutual agreement of the parties. Id. §
1085. A consent decree embodies a compromise where the parties each give up something they
might have won in litigation but save the cost and time of further litigation. Id. § 1082. The
decrees have the effect of estopping future litigation just as a normal judgment does. Id. § 1091.
Courts look at the intent of the parties to the agreement to decide the scope of the agreement's
estoppel effect. Id. The court maintains its jurisdiction in the case. If the decree is violated, the
court can use its contempt power to sanction the noncomplying party. Id. § 1082.
272. See Consent Decree, B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. I11. 1989) (No. 88-C-
5599) (consisting of many substantive reforms by which DCFS agreed to abide); see also Lee
Preston, The House Focuses on the Home, 79 ILL. B.J. 578, 580 (1991) (explaining the financial
ramifications of the consent decree).
273. See Artist M., 112 S. Ct. at 1365 n.6 (explaining that the consent decree in B.H. does not
affect the Court's holding).
274. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have
in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and State with little regard for the views of
the child. Recent cases, however, have clearly held that the children themselves have constitution-
ally protectible interests."); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that an unmar-
ried father, upon the death of the mother, was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a father prior
to having his children taken from him by the state); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(holding that the interests of state and society to protect the welfare of children outweighed the
asserted interests of a parent to raise the child as he or she sees fit and the child's freedom to
observe religious tenets and practices taught by a parent). See generally Mushlin, supra note 5, at
203 (explaining that federal courts did not become involved in cases involving custodial conditions
because of the courts' deference to administrators).
275. 442 U.S. 584 (1979); see supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the
Parham decision).
276. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603-04; see supra notes 172-74 (discussing Parham).
277. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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the rights of children to the authority of school officials.2"9 In these
two cases, the Court focused on the importance of the teacher's un-
disturbed power to discipline the students and to "shap[e] the[ir]
character and value judgments."280
In 1967, the Court began to give children's constitutional rights
more respect.28  For example, in In re Gault,2"' the Court ruled that
children in juvenile court must be given the same type of constitu-
tional protection that is afforded to adult criminals.28 3 Also, in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,284
the Court protected children's First Amendment right to free
speech. There, the Court overrode the school's authority to disci-
pline students by concluding that the schoolchildren had a First
Amendment right to wear armbands in protest of the Vietnam
War.28 5 Still, while children have some constitutional rights, these
rights remain quite limited.286
Constitutional rights are particularly important to children in the
foster care system. 8 7 In the case of an abused or neglected child,
where the child is in imminent physical danger (as opposed to the
situation of a child whose only problem is poverty), the state foster
care system provides the child some protection. 8 8 Consequently, the
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment28 9 and the principle of sub-
278. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
279. See Burt, supra note 133, at 340-41.
280. Goss, 419 U.S. at 593; see Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 683.
281. Burt, supra note 133, at 345-49.
282. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
283. Id. at 41-42. Previously, minors who were taken to juvenile court were not given notice of
their charges, did not have the opportunity to defend themselves against state intervention, and
had no right to a lawyer; also, the adjudication proceeding was not adversarial. Burt, supra note
133, at 345-47.
284. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
285. Id. at 513.
286. See generally Burt, supra note 133, at 329-58 (explaining how traditional authority and
institutions curtail the rights of children as well as parents).
287. Mushlin, supra note 5, at 214 (emphasizing the powerlessness of foster children); see also
Barbara Sullivan, Back Burner. Is a Nation of Children Being Neglected?, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22,
1991, § 6, at 5 ("Never before in the history of America has one generation of children been less
healthy, less cared for or less prepared for life than their parents were at the same age.").
288. See supra text accompanying notes 10-19, 38 (discussing the situations where state inter-
ference in family autonomy is justified); see also Burt, supra note 133, at 351. The state has
historically had the power under the parens patriae doctrine to remove children from their parents
in cases of neglect, abuse, and abandonment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at
1114 (defining the state's traditional role as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disabil-
ity who can not take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from
their parents).
289. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any
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stantive due process290 come into play. If the state fails to protect
the child, the child may be able to claim that the state deprived him
of his due process rights. In this respect, the Constitution should
serve as an ultimate guardian of the rights of that child.
An abused child, however, is not necessarily guaranteed constitu-
tional protection.291 The Supreme Court recently held that the state
is not constitutionally liable for failing to protect a child from pri-
vate violence even though the state has already intervened to protect
the child. 92 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of So-
cial Services, a caseworker from the county department of social
services knew that the petitioner, Joshua, was being abused by his
father.293 The caseworker took various steps to protect Joshua 294 but
did not remove Joshua from his home. Subsequently, Joshua's father
beat him so severely that he suffered permanent brain damage; he is
expected to be institutionalized for the rest of his life.29 5 Joshua,
through his mother and guardian ad litem, brought a suit against
the state, alleging that the state breached a duty to protect him.296
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
290. Substantive due process evolved as a way in which the United States Supreme Court
found fundamental rights and values within the Constitution. GUNTHER, supra note 133, at 441.
At first, the Court used substantive due process to find economic and property rights. Id.; see
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Later the Court extended the Due Process Clause to
embody rights which were not traceable to the text or history of the Constitution. GUNTHER,
supra note 133, at 501-66; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that a woman has a
right to privacy in making the decision to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in making birth control decisions).
291. See Sinden, supra note 35, at 233 ("It is well-established that the Constitution generally
does not impose duties on the State to provide care or protection to its citizens."). For other cases
which limit the state's duties in providing services to its citizens, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982) (finding that the state does not have a duty to provide services to those within its
borders); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (finding that the state has no duty to pay for
medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (finding that the state does
not have a duty to provide medical services).
292. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
293. Id. at 192.
294. Id. at 192-93. The caseworker suggested that the father enroll Joshua in a preschool,
which he never did, that the father's girlfriend move out, which never happened, and that the
father be provided with counseling. The caseworker also visited Joshua's home every month and
noticed and faithfully reported bruises on Joshua. Still, Joshua was never removed from the home.
id.
295. Id. at 193.
296. Id. Joshua argued that he had a special relationship with the state. Id. at 197. In this
sense, Joshua's claim was like that of a constitutional tort. Although common law tort law does
not impose liability for general nonfeasance, it does impose liability for nonfeasance where there is
a special relationship. Here, Joshua claimed that a special relationship existed because the state
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The Court, however, refused to hold the state liable for Joshua's
injuries because Joshua's father, not the state, had physical custody
of Joshua at the time the injury occurred.297 Moreover, the Court
held that the state did not take any affirmative action to place
Joshua in a dangerous position which caused his injury, 29 even
though the case worker had actively intervened in the family for the
purpose of protecting Joshua. The Court concluded that the state
was under no obligation to guarantee a minimal level of safety and
security for a child against the abuse of a private actor (i.e., his
father) 299
Since the Court based its decision largely on the facts that Joshua
was not in the state's custody and that the state was not restraining
Joshua in any manner, the DeShaney decision does not offer guid-
ance where an abused or neglected child is removed from the home
and taken into state custody (i.e., the foster care system). The con-
stitutional rights of children within the foster care system thus re-
main somewhat unclear.
Appellate courts are split on this issue. On the one hand, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Taylor v. Ledbetter,300 held that a child abused
by his foster parents had a constitutional right to physical safety
and the right to be free from infliction of unnecessary pain.3 0 1 Like-
wise, in Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services,"2
the Second Circuit reinstated a jury verdict and damages in favor of
a foster child sexually abused by a foster parent. On the other hand,
was aware of his danger, stated that it would protect him, and acted as if it was going to protect
him. Id. This theory failed, however, because constitutional torts do not encompass the common
law tort doctrine of special relationships where a government official fails to act. Id. at 198-201.
See Sinden, supra note 35, at 233-35.
297. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201; see also Rush v. Johnson, 702 F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. II. 1989)
(finding no state action where a child was placed in the custody of his father and was beaten to
death by a man who was staying at the father's house).
298. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-02; see also Sinden, supra note 35, at 238-39. This commen-
tator explained the Court's state-created danger theory upon which it partially based its opinion:
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to
protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much
an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.
Id. For cases illustrating this theory, see Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982); White
v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972).
299. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
300. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
301. Id. at 795; see also Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (using a
right-to-safety theory to protect foster children).
302. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983) (Doe 1); 709 F.2d 782 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983) (Doe 11).
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the Fourth Circuit, in Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department
of Social Services,30 3 disagreed with both the Eleventh and the Sec-
ond Circuits and did not find the state liable for injuries inflicted by
a foster parent.3 °0
This conflict in the circuits, which DeShaney did not address,
may be resolved by distinguishing the nature of the child's path into
foster care.3 0 5 In Taylor, the state removed an abused child from
the biological parents pursuant to a court order. 30 6 Consequently,
the child's custody was classified as involuntary. 0 7 The court im-
plied that where .the custody is involuntary, state action occurs and
constitutional guarantees apply. However, in Milburn, the parents
voluntarily placed their child into the state's custody pursuant to
Maryland's family law statute. 0 8 In this respect, the state had vol-
untary custody of the child.309 Therefore, the Constitution arguably
does not guarantee the rights of all foster children. Rather, foster
children's rights depend on the nature of entry into the state's
custody." 0
Some scholars suggest that this factual distinction, whether the
parents voluntarily placed the children in the state's custody or
whether the placement was involuntary by the state pursuant to a
court order, is overly formalistic and dangerous.311 This view further
posits that once the state operates a foster care system and affirma-
tively acts to supplant the role of the natural parent, it has the duty
to keep those children safe regardless of the nature of the child's
entry into foster care.3 12 Moreover, a child's "voluntary" entry into
the foster care system may be deceiving. Often, caseworkers per-
suade parents to place their children in foster care as a way to avoid
being labeled a neglectful parent. 313 Likewise, when poor parents
303. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.) (holding that the state did not have an affirmative duty to protect
a child in the custody of foster parents), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
304. Id. at 479.
305. Oren, supra note 20, at 119.
306. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir. 1987).
307. Id. at 795 (comparing the child's removal from his home with the state's commitment of a
mentally retarded child to a state mental institution).
308. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 474.
309. Oren, supra note 20, at 117.
310. Id. at 127-28.
311. Id. at 127-29.
312. Id.; cf. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. 1i1. 1989) ("[A] child who is in
the state's custody has a substantive due process right to be free from unreasonable and unneces-
sary intrusions on both its physical and emotional well-being.").
313. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (identifying the problem of "voluntary"
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face a temporary financial crisis, they may place their children in
the state's care until they are able to overcome the problem. 14
However, when they attempt to get their children back, the foster
care system refuses.315 Therefore, voluntary placement is not always
an accurate description and does not always present a useful distinc-
tion in considering a child's entry into the foster care system.
As a whole, regardless of this formalistic approach, poor foster
children receive little, if any, constitutional protection. Moreover,
since the state often mistakenly perceives poor parents to be abusive
or neglectful,316 the parents' constitutional rights are likewise cur-
tailed.? Consequently, poor parents and their children who have
been subjected to the foster care system have relied primarily on the
Adoption Assistance Act to afford them some type of legal protec-
tion. Although the Artist M. decision precludes the Act from pro-
viding them with the enforceable right to family integrity, the Act's
other enforceable rights318 and the consent decrees prior to Artist
M. are still valid. Therefore, poor families look to the Act, through
existing consent decrees, as their only legal source for the right to
family integrity.
II. THE NORMAN CASE
A. Facts and Procedure
In Norman v. Johnson,319 a class of impoverished parents who
were separated from their children because of their inability to ob-
tain adequate subsistence sued DCFS for violating the Adoption As-
sistance Act.32 0 The Adoption Assistance Act and its codified regu-
lations establish policies and procedures with which Illinois and
DCFS must comply to obtain federal funding. First, DCFS's poli-
cies and practices must be designed to prevent the unnecessary sepa-
placement).
314. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 119.
315. Id. Studies found that almost half of the children who were "voluntarily" placed in foster
care for more than six months never returned home. Id.
316. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (explaining the state's frequent misconcep-
tion of the risk to children, especially in poor homes).
317. See supra text accompanying note 182 (explaining how the traditional constitutional pro-
tection for families fails).
318. See supra notes 203-18 (detailing the enforceable rights of case plans, case review sys-
tems, and dispositional hearings).
319. 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
320. Id. at 1184.
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ration of children from their families. 32 1 The Adoption Assistance
Act mandates that child welfare services make reasonable efforts to
either prevent families from separating or to reunify families which
have already been separated, 22 The Act also requires that various
social service agencies cooperate to fully achieve the policies of the
Act.323 To achieve these policies, the Act requires reunification pro-
grams,3 24 case plans, 32 5 reasonable efforts to reunify the family, 26 a
case review system containing procedural safeguards, 27 and written
notice to parents when the agency denies them any benefits. 28
The class of plaintiffs in Norman consisted of "impoverished par-
ents and legal guardians who have lost, are at risk of losing, will
lose, or cannot regain custody of their children from [DCFS] be-
cause they are homeless or unable to provide food or shelter for
their children." '329 The plaintiffs claimed that DCFS's policies vio-
lated the Adoption Assistance Act.33 0 The complaint alleged that
DCFS took and retained custody of children from impoverished par-
ents and legal guardians because of their inability to secure cash,
food, shelter, or other subsistence, while DCFS failed to assist these
parents to meet these needs. 3 31 The complaint also alleged that
DCFS failed to help needy families secure these necessities.3 2 The
plaintiffs further claimed that DCFS did not make reasonable ef-
forts to prevent the removal of plaintiffs' children or to reunite the
families after they were separated. 333 A final count in the complaint
alleged that DCFS violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution by abridging the plaintiffs' liberty
and property interests in retaining custody of their children and in
maintaining the means to support themselves and their children. 33 4
Although the named plaintiff, James Norman, died before the
district court's ruling, his story is important in illustrating the dy-
321. 42 U.S.C. §§ 625(a)(1)(C), 627(b)(3) (1988),
322. Id. §§ 625, 627(a)(2)(C), 671(a)(15); 45 C.F.R. § 1357.15(e)(1)-(2) (1991).
323. 42 U.S.C. §§ 622(b)(2), 671(a)(4) (1988).
324. Id. § 627(b)(2).
325. Id. §§ 671(a)(16), 675.
326. Id. § 671(a)(15).
327. Id. §§ 627(a)(2)(B), 671(a)(16), 675(5)(c); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d)(4) (1991).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1988); 45 C.F.R. 1355.30(k) (1991).








namics of the case. James Norman worked in a steel mill in Chi-
cago. 3 He had three children, a stepson who graduated from high
school and two girls who were in school and doing well. 3 6 Norman
had to quit his job to care for his terminally ill wife, and he also
developed a heart condition.3 3 7 He worked part-time and took auto
mechanic classes in his spare time, but eventually he was unable to
pay his bills.3 8 As a result, his electricity was turned off in August
of 1988.
Soon thereafter, a DCFS caseworker visited his home. She re-
ported that it was messy, littered with clothes and paper, and that
the refrigerator contained spoiled food and bugs (due to the fact
that there was no electricity). 39 The caseworker reported, however,
that the children looked "very healthy."340 The Worker then filled
out a risk assessment form, but she completed the form incorrectly;
it thus appeared that the Norman children were at a much greater
risk then they actually were.341 As a result, DCFS removed the
Norman children from their father's home without even talking to
Norman and placed them in their great-grandparent's home.342
To visit his children, who now lived over ten miles away, Norman
had to take three different buses and walk one mile.3 43 DCFS did
not provide him with any help in finding an apartment, finding a
job, coping with his heart condition, or travelling to his job inter-
views. Rather they accused him of "lack of supervision" because of
his part-time jobs and classes.3  This accusation was later held to
be unfounded. Finally, after a year, Norman received disability ben-
efits for his heart condition but only through the help of the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago. 46 Norman was then able to af-
ford a new apartment. Unfortunately, twelve days before the court
hearing to get his children back, Norman died of a heart attack.3 4 6










345. Id. at 46; Interview with Diane Redleaf, Supervising Attorney of the Children's Rights
Project of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, in Chicago, I11. (Feb. 7, 1992).
346. WEXLER. supra note 14, at 45.
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The surviving plaintiffs' stories are set forth in the magistrate's
findings of fact. In the case of one plaintiff, Gina Johnson, DCFS
took custody of her child after finding the child had been sexually
abused. 47 Three days later, DCFS won temporary custody of the
child after a court hearing." 8 DCFS created a case plan and re-
ferred Johnson to counseling. 49 Johnson lost her AFDC benefits and
housing, but she was referred to a facility which provided apart-
ments, counseling for emotional, physical, and sexual abuse, and
counseling to help her find housing and employment. 50 Johnson's
case plan included the goals of obtaining a high school diploma, tak-
ing her asthma medication, getting further counseling, joining a
family support group, and retaining an attorney to regain custody of
her children. 5'
Johnson later obtained an apartment, and her counselor felt that
she was ready for the return of her children. 52 The DCFS
caseworker, however, denied the return of the children because he
wanted to see her demonstrate "independent functioning" and "sta-
bility. 353 Consequently, the magistrate found that DCFS did not
deny Johnson the return of the children for economic reasons.354
Also, in light of the coordinated referral services and counseling, the
magistrate found that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the
family. 55
Another plaintiff, Wanda Hilliard, lived with her five children at
her sister's house. 56 DCFS took custody of three of Hilliard's chil-
dren when she left them with her sister without any money or care
plan. 57 Hilliard still lived with her two younger children and found
a studio apartment for them, but the apartment had severe heating
and water problems.3 58 Three different DCFS caseworkers prepared
347. Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1196 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Although the DCFS inves-
tigator found that the child had a long history of sexual abuse, he did not specify how and by
whom she was abused. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1196-97.
350. Id. at 1197.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1198.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1198-99.
356. Id. at 1199.




numerous case plans,3 59 and Hilliard completed all the requirements
of the case plans, but DCFS refused to return her three children
because of the inadequate size of her apartment.360 Hilliard visited
her children frequently and tried unsuccessfully to find housing. 6'
DCFS did not provide her with any cash assistance,6 2 referrals for
housing, help in locating housing, or transportation money so that
she could look for housing or work.3 63 Consequently, the magistrate
found that DCFS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the
family. 64
The magistrate likewise found that DCFS failed to make reasona-
ble efforts to reunite plaintiff Joann Mitchell and her family.3 6 5
DCFS took custody of Mitchell's children in 1985 when the man
with whom she lived reported them as abandoned. 66 Mitchell, how-
ever, claimed that she left the children in the man's care while she
was out for a few hours .36  Her AFDC grant was canceled due to
the removal of her children.36 8 Mitchell called DCFS frequently to
inquire about her children, but DCFS never returned her calls.369
She finally won custody of her children six months after they were
originally taken.3 70 The juvenile court judge instructed Mitchell not
to pick up her children, but to have DCFS deliver them.37 1 How-
ever, because Mitchell was living in shelters, DCFS refused to re-
turn her children and took custody again. It stated that it would
return the children when she found a three-bedroom apartment. 2
DCFS offered no assistance to Mitchell in her attempt to obtain
housing, employment, and transportation because the caseworker
stated that she did not know of any such available assistance.3 73
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1200.
362. DCFS filed a single application for a Harris Fund grant (a privately funded grant), but it
did not make any other efforts for Hilliard to receive money from other charitable sources. Id. at
1199.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1202.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1200.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1201. Mitchell had to learn from a friend where her children were seven weeks after
they had been taken. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id. Mitchell had lost her home and was living in shelters. Id.
373. Id. at 1201-02.
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DCFS also consistently failed to keep visitation appointments and
failed to remove Mitchell's children from their foster home even
though they found that one child had been abused there. 7
B. The Court's Opinion
Although Artist M. v. Johnson rendered the Norman decision in-
effective, it is important to understand how the Norman court ana-
lyzed the issues before it. The Norman court decided three major
issues. First, it held that section 1983 provided a remedy under the
Adoption Assistance Act. 75 Second, the court found that section
671(a)(15)(B) of the Adoption Assistance Act created a private en-
forceable right to reasonable efforts to prevent family separation. 76
Third, the court ruled that both parents and children had standing
to sue under the Adoption Assistance Act.3 7
The threshold issue which the Norman court faced was whether
section 1983 constituted a proper cause of action. 7 8 The district
court ruled that section 1983 was an appropriate cause of action
because the Adoption Assistance Act created clear obligations upon
the states to provide specific benefits.37 9 Since DCFS did not provide
such benefits, the plaintiffs could sue to obtain them.38 In ruling
this way, the Norman court kept Illinois in pace with other jurisdic-
tions that held that rights provided in the Adoption Assistance Act
are enforceable under section 1983.381
Before allowing the plaintiffs to bring this claim under the reason-
able efforts provision of the Adoption Assistance Act, the court had
to determine whether this specific provision created clearly enforcea-
ble rights. The court and the magistrate focused on the statutory
language of the provisions that prior courts found to contain en-
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1202.
376. Id. at 1202-03.
377. Id.
378. Id. Although the Artist M. decision mooted the Norman court's holdings, the Norman
decision remains a useful illustration of a section 1983 analysis.
379. Id. at 1203.
380. Id.
381. Id.; see Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690, 695 (N.D. II1. 1989), aff'd. 917 F.2d 980
(7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992); L.J. v. Massinga, 838
F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1018 (1989); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d
504, 509-12 (1st Cir. 1983); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1011 (N.D. II1. 1989);
B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1403-04 (N.D. I11. 1989); Joseph A. v. New Mexico Dep't of
Human Servs., 575 F. Supp. 346, 353 (D.N.M. 1983).
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forceable rights.3"2 In this respect, the court rejected earlier case
law that either held that the language of the reasonable efforts pro-
vision was too broad to confer any statutory rights383 or that the
Adoption Assistance Act was merely an appropriations act which
created no enforceable rights whatsoever.3 84
The court began by citing cases which held that the reasonable
efforts requirement was enforceable, 85 but it recognized that the
states were not in agreement on such enforceable rights.3 86 Although
the Norman court did not reconcile this conflict between the states,
it addressed the conflict within its own district.38 7 On one hand, the
court in Aristotle P. v. Johnson held that reasonable efforts to re-
unify families were too amorphous to create an enforceable right.3 88
Likewise, the court in B.H. v. Johnson held that there was no en-
forceable right to reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the
children. 9 On the other hand, the Northern District of Illinois, in
Artist M. v. Johnson, more recently held that the Adoption Assis-
tance Act created the enforceable right to the prompt assignment of
caseworkers as a part of the Act's reasonable efforts mandate. 9
The Seventh Circuit subsequently affirmed Artist M., which con-
sequently overruled the decision in B.H. The Seventh Circuit justi-
fied its finding by construing Congress's intent from the language of
the reasonable efforts provision. 9' Nonetheless, even before the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed this issue, the Norman court agreed with the
Artist M. analysis 92 and found it more convincing than that of the
382. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1186, 1203-05.
383. See In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d 360, 365 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that the reason-
able rights provision was too amorphous to be enforced); see also Aristotle P., 721 F. Supp. 1002;
B.H., 715 F. Supp. 1387 (holding that the Act did not create an enforceable right to reasonable
efforts).
384. See In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d at 365.
385. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1186, 1203-05; see In re Burns, 519 A.2d 638, 648-49 (Del.
1986); In re M.H., 444 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); In re Kenny F., 786 P.2d 699,
703-04 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); In re S.A.D., 555 A.2d 123, 127-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
386. See In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d at 365 (rejecting the idea that the Adoption Assistance
Act was anything more than a funding act).
387. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1186.
388. Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. II1. 1989).
389. B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1401 (N.D. I11. 1989). The issue had not been briefed
in front of Judge Grady, but he ruled on it nonetheless.
390. Artist M. v. Johnson, 726 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. II1. 1989), afid, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir.
1990), rev'd sub nom., Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
391. Artist M., 917 F.2d at 986-89.
392. The plaintiffs also extensively briefed the issue, something not done in B.H. v. Johnson,
715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. I11. 1989).
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Aristotle P. and B.H. courts.
The Norman court also dismissed the courts' arguments that the
reasonable efforts standard was too vague as compared to the case
plan and case review provisions.3 93 It acknowledged that the reason-
able efforts provision was not crystal clear, but it held that difficulty
in determining whether the state has complied with this standard is
not a reason for the provision to be unenforceable.3 94 Thus, the court
rejected DCFS's argument that the reasonable efforts standard was
too vague and amorphous to be enforceable. 95
The court also found that either the child or the parent can en-
force such a right with a section 1983 action. 98 The only problem
that would have barred the parents from bringing suit was their lack
of standing, but the court found that this was not an obstacle. 97
Although no cases addressed such an issue, the court looked to other
decisions which recognized the rights of parents.398
Instead of narrowly limiting the rights granted by the statute to
children, the court broadly construed the purposes of the Adoption
Assistance Act. Whereas one court had called the Act merely an
appropriations act, 99 the Norman court stated that "when a statute
provides for the continued unification or reunification of a family, it
cannot be said to be only for the benefit of the children, both the
children and the parents are the beneficiaries of such a policy."400
Consequently the court treated this issue as a standing issue, provid-
ing that whoever could satisfy the standing requirements40 ' would
have the right to sue DCFS.40 2 The plaintiffs suffered a personal
injury when DCFS refused to return their children, and this injury
393. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1186-87.
394. Id. at 1187 ("Contrary to defendant's argument, permitting enforcement does not unduly
deprive the state of flexibility and discretion in providing child welfare services. A standard of
'reasonable efforts' is a flexible standard that leaves much to the discretion of the states.").
395. Id.
396. Id. ("Just as there are no precedents expressly holding that parents can enforce rights
under the AAA, there are no precedents holding parents cannot enforce such rights.").
397. Id. at 1187-88 (finding that the plaintiffs alleged a personal injury which was fairly trace-
able to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief).
398. Id.; see also Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 511-12 (1st Cir. 1983).
399. In re Cynthia A., 514 A.2d 360, 365 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
400. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1188.
401. A person has standing where: I) he suffered a personal injury; 2) which is fairly traceable
to the defendant's unlawful action; and 3) the requested relief is likely able to redress the alleged
injury. Id. at 1187 (quoting Frank Rosenberg, Inc. v. Tazewell Co., 822 F.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 726 (1990)).
402. Id. at 1188.
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resulted from DCFS's failure to make reasonable efforts to prevent
family separation. Thus, the court concluded that the parents had
standing to sue." 3
Finally, the Norman court held that plaintiffs Hilliard and Mitch-
ell successfully stated a section 1983 action by claiming that DCFS
violated their right to reasonable efforts for family preservation.0
Since the court found that DCFS made reasonable efforts with re-
spect to Johnson, it denied her relief.405 As a remedy, the court
granted plaintiffs Hilliard and Mitchell a preliminary injunction.4 0 6
It believed that an injunction Was the proper remedy because Hil-
liard and Mitchell did not have an adequate remedy at law and be-
cause they would suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.40 7
The court also ordered that a caseworker be assigned to prepare a
written case plan outlining any obstacles to obtaining adequate
housing, any resources available to overcoming such obstacles, and
solutions to such problems.40 8 In this respect, the injunction and or-
der insured that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the
families.
C. The Consent Decree
Since Artist M. overruled much of the Norman decision, the con-
sent decree takes on a heightened importance. Pursuant to the deci-
sion, the parties entered a consent decree "[i]n an effort to avoid the
burden, costs and inherent risks of further litigation" and to settle
the matter with respect to the best interests of the class members.4 0 9
In the decree, DCFS agreed to comply with the policy of not taking
children from their homes because of living circumstances of the
family, lack of provisions for the child's substantive needs, or lack of
adequate housing. 10 DCFS was allowed to remove a child from a
home where the child was in imminent danger and where DCFS
had already made reasonable efforts to eliminate the risk to the
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1188-89.
406. Id. at 1190-92.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 1191.
409. Consent Decree at 2, Norman (No. 89-C-1624); Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1182. The class
members are impoverished parents and legal guardians who have lost, are at risk of losing, will
lose, or cannot regain custody of their children because they are homeless or unable to provide
food or shelter for their children. Id. at 1192.
410. Consent Decree at 8-9.
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child.411 "Reasonable efforts" included assistance in locating and se-
curing housing, cash, food, clothing, child care, emergency caretak-
ers, and advocacy with public and community agencies providing
such services.412 Pursuant to this section, DCFS agreed to begin a
cash assistance program which would provide class members up to
$800 a year to prevent the need for removing children from their
homes.4 "
The decree also reached beyond the singular agency of DCFS.
For instance, the decree mandated that DCFS make its "best ef-
forts" to obtain an agreement with the Department of Public Aid to
continue AFDC benefits for ninety days after taking temporary cus-
tody with a possible extra thirty-day extension." 4 It also required
DCFS to establish a "housing advocacy program" to help class
members obtain housing or shelter,. provide the cost of transporta-
tion to such shelter, apply for low-income housing and utilities, se-
cure necessary cash for rent, and obtain current information about
housing opportunities.41
The decree further established rules for DCFS to increase the ef-
ficiency and accuracy of its documentation, its reunification plans,
its risk assessment,416 and its practices in locating absent parents.417
Under this requirement, DCFS agreed to develop a current informa-
tion manual to help DCFS employees obtain goods and services for
class members and to annually train employees to fulfill their obli-
gations under the Adoption Assistance Act.4 8
In addition to all the policies set forth, the decree addressed the
legal rights of impoverished parents. It required that DCFS give
class members written notice of such policies when DCFS first takes
custody of a class member's child, during an administrative case re-
view, 419 and before DCFS requests a class member to sign a service
411. Id.
412. Id. at 8.
413. Id. at 10 (specifying that the purpose of the money is to pay for a security deposit, a
utility connection, utility deposits, furniture, or other necessary items).
414. Id. at 11.
415. Such efforts include a good-faith effort to obtain assistance from the Chicago Housing
Authority and other social service agencies so DCFS can meet its obligation under the decree. Id.
at 14.
416. Risk assessment means those methods and factors which DCFS uses to evaluate the living
conditions when it considers removing a child from the home. Id. at 17.
417. Id. at 16-18.
418. Id. at 15, 20-21 (detailing the training requirements of DCFS employees).
419. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (1988) (defining the case review procedure).
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plan. It also granted all class members an administrative appeal as
set forth in Chapter 89 of the Illinois Administrative Code, section
337.420 Finally, to insure that the provisions in the decree were im-
plemented, a monitor was to be assigned, DCFS's actions were sub-
ject to review from the plaintiffs' counsel, and the court retained
jurisdiction.42 a
III. ANALYSIS
In analyzing Norman it is necessary to separate the opinion from
the consent decree. However, to understand the case's overall effect
they should be viewed as a whole. The consent decree originated and
was dependent on the court's decision, but its validity survives that
decision, which is severely weakened by Suter v. Artist M.422
A. The Court's Opinion
The main value of the Norman decision is that it is a useful illus-
tration of a section 1983 analysis. The court's reasoning is largely
mirrored by the argument of the Artist M. dissent, and it provides a
persuasive, albeit rejected, analysis on the enforceability of the right
to reasonable efforts. Although Artist M. held differently, legal pre-
cedent, legislative history, and public policy support the Norman
court's conclusion that the Act contains the enforceable right to rea-
sonable efforts for family preservation.
1. Legal Precedent
As the Supreme Court indicated in Suter v. Artist M., a section
1983 action lies to enforce rights under the Social Security Act.423
In fact, section 1983 actions constitute the norm where plaintiffs sue
to enforce rights under the Social Security Act.424 Only where the
statute does not create an enforceable right or where Congress pre-
cluded a section 1983 remedy under the statute will section 1983
420. Consent Decree at 19; Norman, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D.,III. 1990).
421. Consent Decree at 17, 19, 23.
422. 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992).
423. Id. at 1366; see supra note 190 and accompanying text (explaining that the Adoption
Assistance Act is part of the Social Security Act).
424. See Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 510 (lst Cir. 1983) ("Since at least 1968 the Su-
preme Court has implicitly and explicitly held that rights under various provisions of the Social
Security Act are enforceable under section 1983.").
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fail to provide a cause of action. 25 Therefore, section 671(a)(15)
would not create an enforceable right for foster children and their
families where the Adoption Assistance Act failed to create such a
right or where Congress somehow precluded foster children and
their families from suing under section 1983.
The main argument espoused by the opponents of the enforceable
right to reasonable efforts stresses that the reasonable efforts provi-
sion of the Act is too vague to create such a right. In order for a
statute to create a federal right, the statute's provision cannot be
" 'too vague and amorphous' such that it is 'beyond the competence
of the judiciary to enforce.' ",426 As the Artist M. Court recognized,
other statutes' reasonable efforts provisions have created enforceable
rights.427 For example, the Brooke Amendment to the National
Housing Act and its regulations, discussed in Wright v. City of Roa-
noke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,428 limited the rent for
low-income tenants of public housing. The Act's regulations stated
that the maximum calculated rent must include "a reasonable
amount for utilities.1 429 The Wright Court had no problem finding
that this provision created the enforceable right to rent calculated
by a "reasonable amount for utilities. '43 0 Likewise, the Boren
Amendment to the Medicaid Act discussed in Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Association431 contained reasonableness language. There,
the amendment mandated that the government reimburse Medicaid
providers according to "reasonable and adequate" rates which the
"State finds . . . [to be] satisfactory to the Secretary. ' ' 432 Similar to
its conclusion in Wright, the Court found that this provision created
an enforceable right to reasonable and adequate rates. 33
The Adoption Assistance Act contains a "reasonable" provision
similar to that in the Brooke and Boren Amendments. Although the
Artist M. Court distinguished the three provisions, the differences
are not great. In fact, as the Artist M. dissent argued, the language
is virtually identical.434 The reasonable efforts provision states:
425. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
426. Id. at 509 (quoting Golden State Transit v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989)).
427. See Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1367-80 (1992).
428. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
429. Id. at 420.
430. Id. at 431-32.
431. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
432. Id. at 507.
433. Id. at 512.
434. Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1371 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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In order for a state to be eligible for payments ..., it shall have a plan
approved by the Secretary which . . . provides that, in each case, reasonable
efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to
prevent or eliminate the need for the removal of the child from his home
and ...to make it possible for the child to return to his home.'"
On its face, the "reasonableness" language of all three acts seems to
contain a similar amount of specificity. Consequently, the Supreme
Court's basis for denying the enforceability of the reasonable efforts
provision is grounded on a weak factual distinction.
Moreover, the reasonable efforts language mirrors that of the
Act's other provisions that create enforceable rights. The provision
pertaining to case plans and a case review system states: "In order
for a state to be eligible for payments . . ., it shall have a plan
approved by the Secretary which . . . provides for the development
of a case plan . . . for each child receiving foster care maintenance
payments under the State plan and provides for a case review sys-
tem."436 Since the language pertaining to the reasonable efforts pro-
vision is essentially the same as that mandating case plans and a
case review system, it appears that Congress intended the reasona-
ble efforts provision to be construed the same as the other provi-
sions. Therefore, all provisions should create enforceable rights.
Moreover, the reasonable efforts provision is contained within the
state plan requirement; it seems illogical to confer the right to a
state plan and then only enforce certain aspects of that right. By
holding that the Act created the enforceable right to reasonable ef-
forts, the Norman court interpreted the Adoption Assistance Act's
language in the only logical way it could be interpreted.
Others have posited, however, that regardless of the enforceable
rights to case plans and case reviews, the reasonable efforts provi-
sion remains vague and amorphous and thus is not enforceable.437
The Norman court correctly pointed out that the reasonableness
standard, although vague, has frequently been used successfully.
Other federal statutes, for example, contain similar standards which
have been held to be enforceable." 8 Moreover, this country's tort
system is largely based on the reasonable person standard. This
435. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
436. Id. § 671(a)(16).
437. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text (explaining DCFS's argument in Artist
M. where it was contended that the reasonable efforts provision does not create an enforceable
right).
438. See supra notes 428-33 and accompanying text (discussing Wilder and Wright).
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standard surely cannot be less vague than the reasonable efforts for
family preservation standard.
Finally, the Norman opinion implicitly invalidated the "vague
and amorphous" argument where it delineated the appropriate fac-
tors to use when interpreting reasonable efforts. By focusing on the
affirmative services which DCFS provided the parents, the court
clarified the reasonable efforts standard. '39 For example, in plaintiff
Johnson's case, DCFS arranged for her counseling, parenting clas-
ses, housing, " °4 and medical support.""1 Even though DCFS did not
return her children, the court found that DCFS's involvement and
affirmative action constituted reasonable efforts because they were
specifically aimed at helping Johnson solve the problems which had
caused her children to be removed. " DCFS did not take sufficient
affirmative action to help the other plaintiffs eliminate the obstacles
which blocked the return of their children. Unlike Johnson's case,
DCFS did not return Hilliard's children due to her inadequate hous-
ing. DCFS did not provide any cash assistance, housing referrals, or,
real effort to obtain private funding." ' Similarly, in plaintiff Mitch-
ell's case, DCFS refused to return her children because of her inad-
equate housing, yet it failed to help Mitchell obtain housing. "4 Al-
though the case seems to unrealistically divide DCFS efforts into
two categories, one where DCFS provides many services and the
other where it provides none, it still establishes some concrete guid-
ance as to what constitutes reasonable efforts. This provision is not
so vague and amorphous that it is "beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce. '4 45
2. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Adoption Assistance Act also sup-
ports the Norman court's conclusion, thus weakening the persuasive-
ness of the Artist M. decision. First of all, the legislative history of
the Act contains many references to the importance of family reha-
439. Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1196-1203 (N.D. 111. 1990).
440. DCFS arranged for her to live at Sarah's Inn, a facility which provides apartments and
job and home-finding counseling. Id. at 1197.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 1198-99.
443. Id. at 1199.
444. Id. at 1201.
445. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987)).
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bilitation.448 In 1980, when Congress passed the Adoption Assis-
tance Act, it specifically focused on keeping children out of the fos-
ter care system.4 7 The country's foster care system was extremely
overcrowded and many children who languished in the system did
not belong there.4" To resolve the problem of unnecessary place-
ment, Congress placed a provision in the Act requiring states to
make reasonable efforts to keep families together before removing
children from their homes. This new provision "require[s] States to
examine alternatives and provide, wherever feasible, home-based
services that will help keep families together, or help reunite fami-
lies."449 Congress still intended that the states continue to immedi-
ately remove children from dangerous situations, but "these agen-
cies will be required to provide such services before removing the
child and turning to foster care. These provisions . . . are among
the most important aspects of this legislation."4 50
Congressional intent is clear; the Act's reasonable efforts provi-
sion was created so that states would provide services to prevent
children from being unnecessarily removed from their homes. Con-
sequently, if families are prevented from enforcing such services, as
in Artist M., the intent of Congress would be defeated. Therefore,
the Norman decision merely reinforced congressional intent for the
Adoption Assistance Act.
3. Policy
The Norman court's approach is even more logical when com-
pared to the alternative remedy proposed by opponents of a section
1983 remedy.45' Such opponents argue that the Adoption Assistance
446. See 126 CONG. REC. 14,645 (1980); 125 CONG. REC. 22,682 (1979); 124 CONG. REC.
34,715-17 (1978); 123 CONG. REc. 24,861-66 (1977).
447. Senator Cranston stated: "In the past, foster care has often been the first option selected
when a family is in trouble .... Far too many children and families have been broken apart
when they could have been preserved with a little effort. Foster care ought to be a last resort
rather than the first." 126 CONG. REC. 6942 (1980); see also 125 CONG. REC. 22,117 (1979)
(remarks of Rep. Rostenkowski) ("In a majority of the cases, there are little or no attempts to
reunite the child with the natural family.").
448. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text (describing the alarming conditions of na-
tional foster care).
449. 126 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 625, 627 (1988) (detailing the policy
and requirements of a state plan).
450. 126 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1980) (emphasis added); see also 126 CONG. REC. 14,645-46
(1980) (remarks of Reps. Conable and Rousselot); 125 CONG. REC. 22,115-16, 22,119 (1979)
(remarks of Reps. Chisholm and Dodd).
451. See Brief for Petitioners at 14, Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992) (No. 90-1488).
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Act provides its own remedial devices which preclude a section 1983
claim.4 52 They assert that the Act is a type of funding contract in
which the state's failure to perform removes the federal govern-
ment's obligation to provide funding. 53 Where the state fails to
comply with the requirements of the Act, the federal government
can simply cut off funding for the state's foster care system. This
argument, however, ignores the purpose behind the Adoption Assis-
tance Act. The Act was not created to merely fund state foster care
systems; it was created to fund such systems for the purpose of pro-
tecting children. 54 As one court aptly stated, Congress did not in-
tend to close "the avenue of effective judicial review to those indi-
viduals most directly affected by the administration of its
program."4 55 If funding was completely cut off, state foster care sys-
tems would be even less able to effectively protect children. There-
fore, the remedy suggested by the opponents of a section 1983 ac-
tion is inconsistent with the goal of providing children a safe home
environment. If families are unable to enforce the rights created by
the Adoption Assistance Act, the purpose of the Act will be lost.
The Norman decision, in holding that the plaintiffs may bring a sec-
tion 1983 claim under the Adoption Assistance Act, implicitly ad-
heres to the logical intent of Congress.
Moreover, the Norman court's opinion fully effectuated the un-
derlying policy of the Adoption Assistance Act by recognizing that
poverty does not justify the removal of children from their homes.
Where children are removed from their parents solely because of
their parents' impoverishment, the children, their families, and the
foster care system suffer. 5 6 As shown by the children in B.H. and
Ashley K., 57 the foster care system is not always a safe haven. Fur-
thermore, the harm to children increases when they are removed
from a happy home as in the Norman situation. The lack of afforda-
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. The Act provides for a "[s]tate plan ...with a view to provision of welfare and related
services which will best promote the welfare of such children and their families." 42 U.S.C. §
622(b)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
455. Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 510 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 420 (1970)).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (describing the real harm to children and fami-
lies where children are unnecessarily removed from their home).
457. See supra notes 53-84 and accompanying text (illustrating the cases of two sets of foster
children who suffered greatly in the foster care system).
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ble housing,458 coupled with the simultaneous insistence on removing
children from their homes because of such poverty," 9 will undoubt-
edly increase the harm to children. Only decisions such as Norman
can stop this trend. The Norman court, in recognizing the policy of
the Adoption Assistance Act, ultimately rejected the inflexible tech-
nical analysis' 60 which many courts used in dealing with the rights
of foster children. Unlike other courts which solely concentrated on
the specificity of the language of the reasonable efforts provision,'6 1
the Norman court synthesized the specific mandates of the Act with
the logical intent of Congress in enacting the legislation."6" Absent
the reqUirement that DCFS make reasonable efforts, history has
proved that reasonable efforts will not be made. 63 The reasonable
efforts provision must create enforceable rights or poverty will con-
tinue to separate families and the goal of the Act will be defeated.
Overall, the Norman decision illustrated a marked step in fulfilling
Congress's goal by mandating the right to reasonable efforts to pre-
serve the family.
B. The Consent Decree
The consent decree reflects DCFS's promise to adhere to the fed-
eral mandates of the Adoption Assistance Act in establishing spe-
cific DCFS policies, goals, and practices.' 6' More importantly, it
binds DCFS to family reunification despite the outcome of Artist
M. The consent decree's policy statement generally follows the fed-
eral mandate of family reunification. DCFS essentially agreed to re-
458. See supra notes 85-131 and accompanying text (explaining the increasing difficulties that
poor parents face, especially in the area of housing).
459. See WEXLER, supra note 14, at 47-54 (showing that poverty is currently used as one of the
major justifications for removing children from the home).
460. See Oren, supra note 20, and accompanying text.
461. Cf. Vermont Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 57 (2d Cir.
1986) (finding an enforceable right to a dispositional hearing); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504
(1st Cir. 1983) (finding an enforceable right to a case plan and review system); B.H. v. Johnson,
715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. II1. 1989) (finding limited enforceable rights to a case review system and
individualized case plans).
462. Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (N.D. III. 1990) (analogizing the Act's
reasonable efforts provision with the "least restrictive setting" provision in the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act: "[Tihe 'crucial inquiry . . . is not whether a State
would knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can
fairly say that the state could make an informed choice.' ") (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)).
463. See HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 3, at 787.
464. Consent Decree at 7-10, Norman (No. 89-C-1624).
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move the children only after all reasonable efforts to keep the family
together have failed or would have failed, and where the children
are in imminent danger.465 This last point is important because it
follows the Adoption Assistance Act's purpose of protecting abused
and neglected children. In this respect, if the children are in danger
at home, the Norman case and the consent decree do not bar the
child's removal. For example, since DCFS still felt plaintiff Johnson
needed to establish that she could act in a "stable and independent
manner," it refused to return her children.466 Poverty was not the
obstacle to reuniting Johnson with her children; rather, DCFS was
concerned about her ability on a sustained basis "to undertake the
responsibilities of being a parent. 467 Consequently, DCFS still re-
tains the power to keep children within the foster care system where
it is in the child's best interests, but the consent decree limits
DCFS's discretion to separate the family for economic reasons.
In comparison to the Adoption Assistance Act, the consent decree
takes a strong position. Even though the Act requires reasonable ef-
forts,468 it is silent as to the point at which the child should be re-
moved when such reasonable efforts fail. Likewise, the Act does not
give a concrete definition of "reasonable efforts" whereas the con-
sent decree does.469 In this sense, DCFS's agreement to be bound by
such a working definition obligates it to a minimum level of compli-
ance under the statute.470 Moreover, this definition finally gives sub-
stance to the standard the Supreme Court found as too amorphous
to be enforced.71
Not only does the consent decree insure DCFS's commitment to
the policy behind the Adoption Assistance Act, it establishes proce-
dures to reach the policy goals.472 It sets deadlines for different pro-
grams DCFS promised to implement. 73 It grants the plaintiffs the
right to appeal the DCFS decisions that threaten their benefits. 474 It
465. Id.
466. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1197.
467. Id. at 1198.
468. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
469. Consent Decree at 8, Norman (No. 89-C-1624).
470. Id. at 7-13. It is also important to keep in mind that by establishing what reasonable
efforts are, the consent decree implicitly limits the standard to what DCFS agreed to in the de-
cree. In this sense, it may restrict the Norman holding.
471. See Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992).
472. Consent Decree at 10-19, Norman (No. 89-C-1624).
473. Id.
474. Id. at 19.
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also provides for a monitor to oversee DCFS's compliance with the
decree.475 It gives the plaintiffs counsel the right to review DCFS's
actions and gives the court continuing jurisdiction in the event that
DCFS fails to comply. 476 In this respect, the consent decree contains
an internal mechanism to secure DCFS compliance and to protect
the integrity of the court's opinion.
The consent decree's third and probably most important aspect is
the inclusion of specific programs which DCFS agreed to imple-
ment. At a minimum, the consent decree reflects DCFS's efforts to
comply with federal law. Like the Adoption Assistance Act, DCFS
officially stated its policy for family reunification.477 In accordance
with this policy, DCFS agreed to implement interagency coordina-
tion, and to help families secure cash assistance, Illinois public aid,
federal assistance, and housing. This provision directly addresses the
problems of parents like Hilliard and Mitchell. With cash and hous-
ing assistance, poor families can weather the tough times without
losing their children. DCFS also agreed to reform some internal
practices and training to better comply with its stated policy. For
example, the revised documentation, risk assessment, employee
training, and case review provisions 478 address the problems illus-
trated in Ashley K. and B.H. With such improvements, children will
be less likely to end up in the bureaucratic quagmire reflected in
Ashley K. and will be less likely to face the unsuccessful multiple
placements of the B.H. children. Finally, the decree insures all class
members an appeal of all issues related to hard services.479 In this
sense, DCFS's obligations merely represent an effort to comply with
the federal statute. However, in light of DCFS's troubled past and
the lack of a section 1983 remedy, this reform is monumental.
One of the most important provisions in the consent decree is its
guarantee of hard services. Whereas the Act is silent on specific
475. Id. at 23-27.
476. Id. at 19-20, 27.
477. Id. at 7-10.
478. See id. at 16-18, 20-21.
479. Id. at 19-20. "Hard Services," as defined in the consent decree, refers to:
Provision of, or assistance in obtaining cash, shelter, utility services, food, clothing,
furniture, or other goods or services to meet subsistence needs or other needs relating
to features of the physical environment that DCFS deems relevant to the issue of
whether a child should be retained in or returned to the custody of their [sic] parents.
Id. at 5.
According to Diane Redleaf, counsel for the plaintiffs, this provision was not implemented as of
February 7, 1992. Interview with Diane Redleaf, supra note 345.
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measures states should take to prevent family separation, the decree
provides for cash and services which enable families to solve the
problems which caused the removal of their children. 80 Poverty is
often the largest cause of both abuse and neglect because it multi-
plies the stress of parenting and makes it difficult for parents to pro-
vide many of the necessary resources for their family.48' Many of
these problems, however, may be eliminated by simple cash assis-
tance.482 By increasing AFDC benefits alone, for example, more
than 6,000 children in the Los Angeles County foster care system
would be able to return home.48 3 In addressing this situation, DCFS
promised in the decree to provide cash assistance of up to $800 a
year so that poverty will not force families to separate.4 84 The de-
cree also provides for an arrangement between DCFS and the De-
partment of Public Aid so that AFDC benefits may be temporarily
continued when DCFS takes children into temporary custody. 5
This arrangement addresses the dilemma which plaintiff Mitchell
faced. Since her AFDC grant was canceled after her children were
removed, she did not have enough money to pay her rent. She ended
up homeless, moving from shelter to shelter, thus eliminating any
chance of getting her Children back.4"6 Had her AFDC benefits con-
tinued until she got her children back, the family could have been
reunited rather than remaining splintered.
Although the consent decree provides impoverished parents with
some services, it does have some drawbacks. First, it should not be
mistaken for a solution to the underlying problem of poverty. It ad-
dresses immediate emergencies and risks to the child and is not
aimed at raising the standard of living of the parents. While no one
can deny that $800 or assistance in finding an apartment is a real
gain, it is important to remember that such assistance is temporary.
480. Consent Decree at 19-20, Norman (No. 89-C-1624); see also Golubuck, supra note 5.
481. See WEXLER, supra note 14, at 47.
482. Id.
Wiping out poverty would not wipe out child abuse. But simply ameliorating the
worst conditions of poverty would go a long way toward dramatically reducing child
abuse and neglect. . . . [According to studies] poor children were five times more
likely to be labeled physically abused and nearly twelve times more likely to be la-
beled physically neglected.
Id.; see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
483. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 53.
484. Consent Decree at 10, Norman (No. 89-C-1624).
485. Id. at 11-13. According to Diane Redleaf, counsel for the plaintiffs, such an arrangement
was not completed as of February 7, 1992. Interview with Diane Redleaf, supra note 345.
486. Norman, 739 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
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A further factor limiting the value of the Norman consent decree
is the general nature of consent decrees. First, consent decrees are
difficult to enforce. Although the Norman decree has a monitor,
there is no guarantee that the monitor oversee the decree's enforce-
ment. Likewise, there is no way to guarantee that the monitor is
effectively monitoring. 87 Even if the monitor is effective and deter-
mines that the consent decree has been violated, the lengthy process
of litigation begins all over again. Therefore, by the time a judge
issues a ruling of contempt,488 irreparable harm may have already
occurred .489
Third, since consent decrees usually arise from class action litiga-
tion, they involve lengthy negotiations and all class members must
be notified of any settlement. 90 This involves time, effort, expense,
and inevitable delay. In this respect, the decree may not be the most
effective and timely device to enforce a plaintiff's rights, especially
in the area of foster care. For example, by the time the Norman
consent decree came down in 1991, the case had been in the courts
for over two years and the named plaintiff had died. During this
period many families were presumably separated without reasonable
efforts to keep the family together. In light of the burdensome and
time-consuming character of such decrees, their usefulness in at-
tacking the abuses of the foster care system is limited.
Despite these limitations, consent decrees remain the only viable
solution. Where there is a need for social change, litigation provides
a quicker remedy than legislation. Moreover, the Norman consent
decree may survive the adverse ruling in Artist M. Since DCFS ob-
ligated itself in the consent decree, the Norman court will still have
jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree, regardless of the result in
Artist M.491 Furthermore, if DCFS tries to modify the consent de-
cree pursuant to the Artist M. ruling, it would likely be unsuccess-
ful. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[i]f it is clear
that a party anticipated changing conditions that would make per-
487. See Susan L. Brooks, Rethinking Adoption: A Federal Solution to the Problem of Perma-
nency Planning for Children with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1159 n.220 (1991)
(explaining'the inherent limitations in consent decrees).
488. Consent decrees are enforced by the contempt power of the court. See Consent Decree at
27, Norman (No. 89-C-1624).
489. Brooks, supra note 487, at 1159 n.220.
490. Id. at 1158 n.213.
491. The consent decree in B.H., which covers all the children in the foster care system, also
remains intact despite the Artist M. decision. See Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1365 n.6
(1992).
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formance of the decree more onerous but nevertheless agreed to the
decree, that party would have to satisfy a heavy burden to convince
a court . . . that it should be relieved of [its obligations].""' Since
the Artist M. case was pending in the Supreme Court at the time
DCFS entered into the Norman decree, DCFS clearly knew that its
obligation to make reasonable efforts was at issue. Nevertheless, it
agreed to be bound by such obligations in the Norman decree so it
is unlikely to be relieved of its obligations.
Overall, the consent decree offers Illinois foster children some
hope and protection. How this plays out in reality, however, is yet to
be seen.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Court's Opinion
Norman signals the increased national movement for family reha-
bilitation. The Norman court's broad interpretation of the Adoption
Assistance Act demonstrates Illinois's willingness to liberally grant
foster children and their parents substantive rights under the rea-
sonable efforts provision. '93 Consequently, Illinois families should no
longer be helpless once DCFS enters their lives. If the Norman deci-
sion worked in a vacuum, families could expect help from DCFS
whenever they experienced a crisis. Previously, DCFS took children
while maintaining an attitude of indifference towards the families'
problems. Without the help of DCFS, these families would have had
the right, under Norman, to force DCFS to make such efforts.
Moreover, if DCFS removes children without providing assistance,
parents should be able to challenge DCFS when they feel that the
family has been unnecessarily separated. If the reasonable efforts
mandate of Norman binds DCFS as the plaintiffs envisioned, poor
parents like plaintiffs Norman, Hilliard, and Mitchell should not
have to suffer the trauma of having their children taken away as a
result of their poverty. Likewise, poor children would not be sub-
jected to the foster care system just because their parents are poor.
The scenario embraced by the Norman plaintiffs applies to many
492. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 761 (1992).
493. Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182, 1187-88 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("A standard of 'reason-
able efforts' is a flexible standard that leaves much to the discretion of the states. . . . [Wihen a
statute provides for the continued unification or reunification of a family, it cannot be said to be




poor families nationwide. Many states have responded similarly to
the Norman court; Washington, Utah, Maryland, Virginia, New
Hampshire, Louisiana, and Vermont have established highly suc-
cessful family rehabilitation programs.49 4 New Hampshire's system
illustrates this success. There, families receive intensive services (in-
cluding family counseling, social work, and education) and have a
caseworker on call all of the time.495 These intensive services help
the families cope with their problems and help alleviate some of the
stresses which accompany poverty. In New Hampshire, 76 % of the
families helped were able to remain together rather than being
splintered by the foster care system. 96 Thus, the integrity and pres-
ervation of poor families can be. protected by such programs. 9
7
Reasonable efforts, as depicted in the Norman case and the reha-
bilitation programs of these states, can begin to address poverty and
the resulting problems it causes in poor families. Unless poor fami-
lies can force DCFS to provide extra money for a security deposit or
to help pay electricity bills, healthy and happy children will be sepa-
rated from their parents not because they are abused or neglected,
but because they are poor. Without the enforceable right to reasona-
ble efforts, these families will often be unable to remedy their prob-
lem of poverty and may never regain their family integrity.
Not only would the enforceable right to reasonable efforts and
family rehabilitation programs protect the integrity and stability of
many poor families, it would also save the state a substantial sum of
money in the long run. It is expensive to remove children from their
parents; it costs up to $3,000 a month for a child to remain in foster
care.4 98 Since temporary custody is rarely "temporary,"499 the
state's expenses rapidly accumulate. The skyrocketing number of re-
ports of abuse and neglect and the sheer number of children enter-
494. H.R. REP. No. 395, supra note 5, at 91-95.
495. Id. at 92-93.
496. Id. at 93.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82 (emphasizing that there is no constitutional
right to family preservation or to services which would help keep the families together).
498. Interview with Diane Redleaf, supra note 345; see 134 CONG. REC. 15,857-58 (daily ed.
June 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Miller) (stating that it costs anywhere between $500 to $1000
per month for each child in foster care simply because their parents did not have housing); WEX-
LER, supra note 14, at 51.
499. See WEXLER, supra note 14, at 11-29 (describing the horrifying story of parents whose
children were taken away because of unfounded reports of abuse, and the trials which they exper-
ienced to get their children back).
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ing the system further add to the astronomical cost. 500
By comparison, the minimal cash and housing assistance needed
to keep families together is a more cost effective alternative.50' This
is evident in the states which have family rehabilitation programs:
Maryland saved $6.2 million for every 1,000 children who received
family rehabilitation services; Louisiana saved nearly $1 million in
implementing its family rehabilitation system; and Vermont saved
approximately $1.24 million. In light of Illinois's budget problems,
the ramifications of Norman should not be minimized.50 2 In addition
to the cost of keeping children in the system, the burden on the
courts and the state could be greatly reduced by eliminating much
of the underlying causes of abuse and neglect.
Moreover, an enforceable right to reasonable efforts and family
rehabilitation could also decrease homelessness by helping those
families on the verge of losing their housing. A major cause of chil-
dren being put into the foster care system is homelessness among
families. 503 When children are taken away, impoverished parents
must expend even more money to prove to DCFS that they are suit-
able parents, either by spending money on transportation or by
spending money on gifts for the children.50 ' Accordingly, they have
less money to solve their housing problem in order to get their chil-
dren back. Furthermore, foster care is often little better than home-
lessness;50 5 the children may be better off with their parent's inade-
quate housing than in the state's custody. 506 If DCFS assists such
families in holding on to their current houses, or assists them in
finding new housing, it could solve their housing and their family
500. 125 CONG. REC. 22,681 (1979).
501. See John Hartstock, Foster Care, St. News Serv., June 9, 1987, available in LEXIS,
Government News Library, SNS File (illustrating a case where intensive family services were less
expensive then keeping a child in foster care).
502. Gary Davis, Cutting Won't Solve Budget Problems, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1992, § 4, at 18;
Laurie Goering & Rob Thomas, State Tax Delay Hurting Towns Cash-Flow Problems, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 20, 1992, § 1, at 1; Rick Pearson & Robert Vitale, Oops, Edgar Cuts Don't Add Up,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1992, § 1, at 1.
503. WEXLER, supra note 14, at 50-53.
504. Id. at 187. Parents may give their children gifts to try to impress the caseworker and to
prove that they are genuinely interested in getting their children back.
505. Id. at 180 (equating the foster care system's overnight shelters with the same conditions of
homelessness).
506. See generally id. at 179-86 (detailing the conditions of emergency shelters); Rob Karwath,
Culture of Violence, Abuse Reported at Homer Center, CHI. TRIB. Oct. 29, 1991, § I, at 1, 17
(describing the horrors at Illinois's largest mental hospital for children as one example of this
state's facilities which are intended to protect children).
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problems at the same time. However, since foster children and their
families cannot sue to enforce reasonable efforts, they lose family
integrity, the state spends more money, and the problems associated
.with poverty are exacerbated.
Since the Supreme Court in Suter v. Artist M. ruled that foster
children do not have an enforceable right to reasonable efforts under
the Adoption Assistance Act, many rights of poor children and fam-
ilies have been taken away. First, the Supreme Court decision may
be interpreted to go even further, holding that the Act creates no
enforceable rights whatsoever. If the majority's dicta about the Act
only requiring a state plan 50 7 is followed, this could eliminate the
right of foster children to a case plan, 08 a case review system,50 9
and a dispositional hearing.510 Artist M. also signals a retreat from
section 1983 actions. It illustrates the Supreme Court's reluctance
to let beneficiaries of federal funding sue to enforce their statutory
rights. This has grave repercussions in areas such as Medicaid, wel-
fare, national housing, and Social Security. In a worst case scena-
rio, the Supreme Court could strike down the enforceability of all
slightly vague or broad rights that these statutes embody..
Moreover, the constitutional analysis of family rights does not
compensate for an enforceable right to reasonable efforts. On the
one hand, the Supreme Court recognizes and praises the family.512
On the other hand, the Court has yet to accept a constitutional right
to family preservation. Likewise, there is no constitutional right to
assistance.5 3 Therefore, neither parents nor children have a consti-
tutional right to reasonable efforts for family preservation such as
cash or housing assistance.
B. The Consent Decree
The consent decree, as the enforcement mechanism of the deci-
507. See supra note 218 (discussing the possibility that the only enforceable right is that of a
state plan).
508. See Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
509. See Lynch, 719 F.2d 504; B.H., 715 F. Supp. 1387.
510. Vermont Dep't of Social & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1986).
511. All the statutes which guarantee such benefits are federal funding statutes just like the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.
512. See generally supra notes 133-49 and accompanying text (discussing the court's deference
to parental rights).
513. The Constitution does not require that the state provide services for its citizens; see text
accompanying supra notes 181-82; supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
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sion, has more potential to bring reform to DCFS and to finally
fulfill many of the goals of the Adoption Assistance Act. First, the
form of the decree is important. Since it provides for a monitor and
for continued jurisdiction of the court, it appears readily enforcea-
ble. In one sense, the decree reflects a structural injunction aimed at
reforming DCFS. 51" Such an injunction can be highly effective espe-
cially where it orders specific affirmative action and hard cash. 515
For example, the consent decree binds DCFS to provide parents
with hard services including assistance in locating and securing
housing, temporary shelter, cash assistance, food, clothing, child
care, emergency caretakers, or efforts to obtain these services from
other community organizations. 5 6 This agreement alone should pro-
vide great help to poor parents to improve themselves and become
better parents. Without such aid, these parents risk losing their in-
come and home. Without an income or a home, the probability of
the parents solving their problems and getting their children back is
quite low. 17 In this respect, the consent decree should provide relief
to many poor families.
Although the consent decree represents a concentrated effort to
reform one aspect of DCFS, inherent problems in the decree pre-
clude long range reform. First, many of the decree's provisions de-
pend on interagency coordination. 5" Since the Norman decree only
binds DCFS, some of DCFS's reasonable efforts will be largely inef-
fective unless other agencies have funds and resources to provide
services. For example, if the Chicago Housing Authority does not
agree to help DCFS find alternative housing for parents with inade-
quate shelter,5 1 9 the benefits promised by Norman may not reach
such parents. The referral services provision is similar to the housing
assistance provision in that it depends on the willingness of other
514. See Mushlin, supra note 5 at 252-56 (arguing that structural injunctions, like the Brown
v. Board of Education injunctions enjoining segregation in school districts, are the most effective
judicial measures in reforming state foster care systems).
515. Id.
516. Consent Decree at 8, Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (No. 89-C-
1624).
517. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31 (explaining the downward cycle that traps
impoverished parents when they lose their children to the foster care system).
518. See supra text accompanying notes 409-21 (detailing the provisions of the consent decree).
519. Consent Decree at 14, Norman (No. 89-C-1624). The decree failed to guarantee assis-
tance from the Chicago Housing Authority, stating instead that the "[diefendant shall make




agencies to help the class of parents. 2
In addition to the weakness of the specific provisions, the Norman
consent decree was not intended to completely reform DCFS.521
Rather, the Norman decree is focused on family preservation. Even
in this one area, reform may be slow. The large barrage of current
lawsuits against DCFS512 illustrates that this agency suffers from a
nearly complete organizational breakdown. Even though DCFS may
have bound itself to certain duties, 523 it takes time and money to
effectuate such changes. Workers remain poorly trained and over-
worked, so children continue to suffer. 52 4 Thus, due to the difficulty
of interagency coordination and the magnitude of needed reforms,
the potential positive impact of the Norman consent decree is
limited.
Furthermore, the potential benefit of a consent decree, like that in
the Norman decision, remains unrealized as long as poor families
are not aware of their rights and do not have the power to enforce
such rights. Until poor families are educated about the benefits to
which they are entitled in the consent decree, such benefits will be
of no use. To educate families like the plaintiffs in Norman, DCFS
must adhere to the decree's requirement to. inform families of the
alternatives to losing their children because of their poverty. Since
DCFS workers are in close contact with families, they have the
power and the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to maintain
families instead of removing children from their homes. This, how-
ever, is not a perfect world. DCFS, rather than embracing such du-
ties, challenged such obligations before the Supreme Court.5 25
Therefore, it is unlikely that poor families will be fully informed of
their rights.
Despite the limitations of the opinion and the consent decree, the
520. Id. at 15.
521. Interview with Diane Redleaf, supra note 345.
522. See Artist M. v. Johnson, 917 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992);
Norman v. Johnson, 739 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. II1. 1990); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp.
1002 (N.D. I11. 1989); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. 11. 1989); Rush v. Johnson, 702
F. Supp. 1416 (N.D. I11. 1989).
523. See supra text accompanying notes 409-21 (discussing DCFS's duties under the consent
decree).
524. See, e.g., Karwath, Month's after Kids' Deaths, supra note 51, at 1, 16 (describing cases
where DCFS workers lied about their completed efforts for children in their care). In September
1991, a DCFS caseworker went to trial because of his failure to protect a child in his care. Id.
525. See supra text accompanying notes 243-50 (explaining DCFS's challenge to the reasona-
ble efforts provision as an enforceable right under the Adoption Assistance Act).
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real gain of Norman should not be ignored. Even if its potential is
not fully realized, some families are being protected. In terms of
real figures, the gain is substantial. 528 Not only has the Norman de-
cision succeeded in Illinois, but other family preservation programs
have shared similar success. For example, in Washington and Utah,
68 % of the children whose families received family preservation ser-
vices remained at home, while 69 % of children whose families did
not receive such services entered the foster care system.527 Similarly,
Maryland's Intensive Family Services program greatly decreased
the number of children entering the system and consequently saved
the state $6.2 million.52 8 Other successful state programs include
those implemented in Virginia, New Hampshire, and Vermont.529
Thanks to the Norman decision, Illinois can join in the success of
these states and focus on family preservation rather than separation.
CONCLUSION
Overall, Norman v. Johnson offered protection to Illinois foster
children by providing them with the substantive right of reasonable
efforts to family reunification, at least until the Supreme Court's
decision in Artist M. Despite ten years of lingering in the Illinois
foster care system, children are still unable to realize the federal
rights granted by the Adoption Assistance Act. Without the Nor-
man consent decree, children and their families would not have the
right to stay together. Norman illuminates the best interests of the
child. The ideals encompassed by Norman, however, are tarnished
by the reality of reforming the foster care system and are endan-
gered by DCFS's resistance to its obligation of reasonable efforts to
keep poor families together.
Elizabeth A. Sammann
526. Interview with Diane Redleaf, supra note 345.
527. H.R. REP. No. 395, supra note 5, at 91.
528. Id. at 91-92.
529. See id. at 92-94 (illustrating the success which each of these states has had with its family
preservation programs).
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